

Defence Reform Initiative for
Bosnia and Herzegovina /Serbia and Montenegro
The DRINA project

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**A compilation of contributions to the DRINA workshops in
Belgrade (13-14 May) and Sarajevo (10-11 June) 2005**

**Edited by Jos Boonstra
CESS Programme Manager**

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**The Centre for European Security Studies
Lutkenieuwstraat 31a
9712 AW Groningen
The Netherlands
Tel: +31-50-3132520
Fax: +31-50-3132506
Website: www.cess.org**

Preface

Defence reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and in Serbia and Montenegro (SCG) is proceeding at a satisfactory pace in comparison with other sectors that need attention. This piece of good news is overshadowed by the fact that both post-conflict societies are still not member of the Partnership for Peace Programme (PfP) of NATO. Without having handed over the two top war-crimes suspects to the International Criminal Tribunal on Yugoslavia (the ICTY) or having proven that their security structures – and the politicians that control these structures – do everything within their power to apprehend both Mladic (probably in SCG) and Karadzic (most likely in BiH) it will not be possible to gain access to the Partnership Programme. However, this does not mean that both countries are regionally and internationally fully isolated when it comes to security and defence. BiH and SCG participate in a variety of regional activities and structures that have been established during the last five years; and NATO is working with both countries through Tailored Cooperation Programmes (TCP).

The reason for focussing here on BiH and SCG is not just that these two countries have the most catching-up to do. The scope for constructive exchanges between them is considerable, principally because their circumstances are similar (though not identical). Each is striving – and with some success – to pursue fundamental defence reform in unpromising conditions: the reorganisation of armed forces; provision for state level executive direction and; improving legislative oversight. All of this despite the uncertain future of the state union (in the case of SCG) and the burden of the Dayton legacy (in BiH). In addition, both face continued exclusion from PfP; and both worry about the potential fall-out from resolution of Kosovo's future, in terms of precedents and repercussions.

The Centre for European Security Studies (CESS) decided last year to focus on these two countries so to assess how defence reforms relate to the demands set by NATO for entering PfP. Together with the Belgrade Centre for European Integration (BeCEI) and the Sarajevo-based Centre for Security Studies (CSS) CESS organised two workshops were organised under the header *DRINA – Defence Reform Initiative for BiH and SCG*. Participants in these meetings included political personalities, senior officials and military officers, elected representatives and parliamentary staffs, together with individuals from academic institutions, think tanks, the media, interest groups and other civil-society organisations. In other words, we aimed at the broadest possible engagement in dialogue.

One result of this dialogue is this compilation of contributions. Some of these writings are lightly edited presentations; others are papers written by experts that attended the workshops. This CESS Occasional starts out with an overview paper on defence reform and PfP membership aspirations of BiH and SCG by *Merijn Hartog* who was the principal CESS programme manager for the DRINA exercise. After this first attention is devoted to SCG and then to BiH as was the chronological order of both events. In each case you will find a contribution by a representative of our local partner institute – *Jovan Teokarevic* advocates a collective approach by the EU and NATO towards the Western Balkans while *Denis Hadzovic* gives an overview of the civil society landscape in BiH. Next are papers from the representatives of BiH and SCG at NATO in Brussels; *Branislav Milinkovic* explains Serbian-Montenegrin progress made towards PfP membership and writes about the current SCG's chairmanship of the SEEGROUP while *Sven Alkalaj* describes BiH's journey to increased cooperation with NATO. This is followed by contributions of NATO representatives. *John Colston* goes deeper into the essentials of defence reform and *Patrice Dabos* explains NATO's policy towards BiH and the way the TCP works. What follows are two papers by local contributors for each country. In the case of SCG *Miroslav Mladenovic* goes into theory of civil-military relations and to the difficulties in developing these relations in a democratic way in his country; and *Mladen Momcilovic* writes about developing legislative oversight mechanisms in SCG. The BiH contributors are *Brane Jankovic* who gives an overview of state level versus entity level competences of defence, while *Christian Haupt* and *Daniel Saracino* of the OSCE Mission in Sarajevo write about the process of defence reform in BiH, as well as the work of the Defence Reform Commission. They argue that the parallels between BiH and SCG are indeed strong.

Taken together the material presented here gives a broad overview of where both BiH and SCG stand in relation to defence reform and in joining the Partnership for Peace. I would like to thank all contributors and participants to the workshops but especially those who delivered papers for this compilation of ideas and overviews on a variety of defence-related subjects. This CESS Occasional – and the DRINA project – would not have been possible without the expertise and hard work of *Jovan Teokarevic* (BeCEI) and *Denis Hadzovic* (CSS) who made this small but influential project into a success and to our sponsors, the Dutch SFMO Foundation and NATO's Public Diplomacy Division.

28 October 2005

Jos Boonstra
CESS Programme Manager

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Defence reform and PfP aspirations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Serbia and Montenegro

Merijn Hartog

Merijn Hartog is Programme Manager at the Centre for European Security Studies (CESS), the Netherlands

Due to recent developments the road towards Euro-Atlantic integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and Serbia and Montenegro (SCG) could be characterised as rough and now and then wearisome. First, the most wanted war crime suspects are still at large, in spite of repeated promises to finally turn them in. Second, the police reform process in BiH was openly obstructed by Republika Srpska (RS) with great perseverance, which both illustrates and deepens the distrust between the two entities. And third, political rivalry between Belgrade and Podgorica continues within the state union of SCG. One example of this was the recent scandal during which Defence Minister (and ethnic Serbian) Prvoslav Davinic had to resign according to Belgrade while strangely enough Podgorica wanted him to stay on his post after accusations of corruption. When Davinic resigned the scandal was immediately followed by a situation in which the government backed former general Stankovic (an acquaintance of Mladic) to become the new Minister of Defence, despite fierce criticism from the President who emphasized that no other country seeking EU and NATO membership has a former general as defence minister. Due to these political difficulties and rivalries in BiH and SCG international assistance is irregular (especially in the case of SCG) and international institutions and foreign governments are following developments in both countries in a critical manner. However, one process seems to be implemented with some success in both countries, namely defence reform. This is both remarkable and encouraging.

When working on defence reform, both BiH and SCG have to cope with the hindering legacies from their past, caused by the Yugoslav wars of the nineties. Breaking with the past, they need to make their defence sector *affordable*, preventing it from taking up resources more urgently needed for other purposes. In the same vein, they have to make sure their armed forces are made *appropriate* and geared to the country's current defence and security priorities. Finally, they have to ensure that their defence sector is *acceptable* to society at home and potential allies abroad. This is easier said than done. Nonetheless, the wheels of restructuring and reforming armed forces and defence organisations are turning in both countries at a satisfactory pace.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

BiH has the most complex state structure in the Western Balkan region and far beyond. Until recently this was reflected in a no less complicated defence organisation. By the end of the war, BiH formally had two armies (the Federation of BiH army and the RS army), but in reality it had three; a Bosniac, a Croat and a Serbian force. This resulted in two separate defence systems. However, the necessity of reforming the whole defence apparatus became inevitable when the BiH Presidency expressed its ambition to enter PfP in June 2001. The establishment of the Defence Reform Commission (DRC) by the High Representative Paddy Ashdown in May 2003 and the publication of the comprehensive report *The Path to Partnership for Peace* in September of that year was a clear signal that the BiH government was serious about defence reform. The country developed a rigorous implementation schedule to achieve the reform goals that were set.

The two most important changes that took place were, first, the establishment of a state level Ministry of Defence under the supervision of the Presidency of BiH. The entity level ministries became responsible for the administrative chain of command and therefore lost a lot of their authority. The second change that was brought about was the establishment of parliamentary oversight. In the autumn of 2003, a Joint Security and Defence Committee was established at the state level. Security and defence committees continued to exist at the entity level. Many international observers regarded this achievement as one of the most important successes that was pulled off in the context of defence reform.

By mid-2004 reform had already greatly advanced the 'beyond Dayton' agenda. Since early 2005 there has been a functioning and more or less fully staffed, national Ministry of Defence in Sarajevo. It is now possible to speak of the Armed Forces of BiH, instead of the (indigenous) armed forces *in* BiH. The most remarkable outcome was the support for these changes from the side of the Republika Srpska. Unfortunately, the RS took a different attitude towards police reform later that year. By mid-2005 this process was in deadlock, but after extensive talks and severe international pressure, the proposed police reform package was accepted by the RS Parliament in October.

Serbia and Montenegro

SCG is in troubled waters. The state union is not developing as it should; there are strong nationalistic tendencies in Serbia; the unresolved issue of Kosovo's definitive status is creating tension; economic reforms are sluggish and the population is disappointed and weary of elections and outside interference. However, in at least one respect things are

moving ahead. So far as the armed forces and defence are concerned times seem to have changed. They started changing around three years ago – which is when interest in joining PfP was first expressed – and some fundamental reforms were enacted by the post-Djindjic administration in 2003, riding the wave of outrage that followed the former leader's assassination.

The driving force at the start of the country's military transformation, in 2003, was Boris Tadic, the Minister of Defence at that time. In a few months SCG successfully: (i) set about laying the groundwork for a comprehensive programme of reform by subordinating the General Staff to the ministry; (ii) got rid of some uncooperative top military leaders and severely reduced the officer core; (iii) initiated thereby a shift in thinking within the military from the old prioritisation of regime security to a more appropriate emphasis on national security; and (iv) developed a mid-term plan of reforms, covering for instance the reorganisation of both the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff.

On taking office in early 2004, the new government's team at the defence ministry headed by Prvoslav Davinic advanced the reform agenda further, although at a slower pace. One reason for this loss of momentum is that, although defence is a state union responsibility, this does not mean that decision-making for defence is immune to the tensions that characterise relations between the constituent Republics. This was illustrated by the difficulties and delays in which SCG formulated a Defence Strategy. It could not be called a National Security Strategy, since the Republics deal with security and the state union only with defence. The other important defence policy document to be published was a White Paper that outlined the reform process in several stages. It is also available in English so to inform those interested outside the country; an appropriate example of increased transparency.

Nonetheless, some problems still need serious attention. First of all, despite some improvement, the process of democratic control – both by Parliament and by civil society – remains weak. Second, some forces within SCG are opposed to further reforms and Euro-Atlantic integration and might want to obstruct further progress. And third, the issue of Kosovo's status and the relative dysfunctional state union will remain a problem for some time to come. Some of these problems (and other issues) have led the EU to the conclusion that it has to deal separately with Serbia and Montenegro if it wants to maintain the momentum in the process of preparation for membership (the twin track approach). The same problem might arise with respect to NATO. When the time comes that SCG can opt for NATO's MAP process in order to integrate into the Alliance, it will be unclear whether NATO

will be dealing with Belgrade, Podgorica and Pristina separately, together or in another combination.

NATO and the Partnership for Peace

It is important to bear in mind that NATO should be considered as one of the main promoters of defence reform in the Euro-Atlantic area, that is to say in NATO member states, Membership Action Plan (MAP) states, the PfP community and in countries that have other cooperative relationships with NATO. However, in the context of BiH and SCG, NATO faces a dilemma. It can offer them a fast track towards integration as it did to several Central and East European countries. The rapid integration of SCG and BiH into NATO (through PfP and MAP) could probably serve as an efficient way to provide for stabilised and strengthened state structures and, consequently, for guaranteeing security in the Western Balkans. However, NATO does not want to consider the possibility of PfP membership as long as BiH and SCG are allegedly harbouring persons suspected of grave war crimes. This politically motivated conditionality stands in the way of PfP membership and therefore of encapsulating both BiH and SCG in the stabilizing environment that emanates from NATO. This is the dilemma the international community had to deal with in the recent past. Should BiH and SCG be integrated into NATO as soon as possible to promote stability and security in South-East Europe (and in order to capture the war crime suspects with the full use of the NATO apparatus) or should both countries be required to first catch the 'big fishes' by themselves (as proof of their good intentions) before they are admitted to the Partnership?

In June 2004 it became clear at which of these two options the Alliance was aiming. At the NATO summit in Istanbul it was decided that both countries had to fulfil the political conditions before gaining PfP membership. However, on the bright side, the efforts made by BiH and SCG so far were welcomed and appreciated. Therefore the Alliance emphasized it would assist both countries in their endeavour to integrate into NATO structures. On this basis, BiH and SCG were included in selected PfP activities from June 2004 onwards. Working through an activity like the Tailored Cooperation Programme (TCP) gives both countries ample opportunity to familiarise themselves with NATO topics. TCP includes a lot of practical activities and allows for a substantial level of cooperation. Besides, it provides SCG and BiH with useful lessons learned by countries that recently joined NATO. In fact, working through TCP means that SCG and BiH are cooperating more actively with NATO than some full PfP members do.

Two in One: The Western Balkans vs. EU-NATO Parallel Enlargements

Jovan Teokarevic

Jovan Teokarevic is Director of the Belgrade Centre for European Integration (BeCEI), Serbia and Montenegro

States like Serbia-Montenegro and other Western Balkan countries, that are late in Euro-Atlantic integration, share one common problem. By the time they get to the EU and NATO doors that should open the way for their long-awaited memberships, they realize that these organisations have in the meantime changed, together with the regional and global contexts. Once they are eventually granted access and receive their membership cards, they see they've become part of a group that resembles what they have been targeting for a long time, but is not exactly what they had in mind in first instance. This awareness is usually followed by the question of whether the benefits are bigger than the price paid. Disappointment often replaces hyper-inflated and unrealistic expectations. Why is this often the case?

First of all, our goals – the EU and NATO as symbols of better alliances than our previous ones – naturally change from within in harmony with new global and local dynamics and challenges. The North Atlantic Alliance was created half a century ago, in order “to keep the Americans in, Soviets out and Germans down”. This formula for the protection of Western Europe from both the National-Socialist and the Communist threats managed to safeguard the “free world”, and indeed the whole world, from yet another world war, and finally triumphed peacefully fifteen years ago over the crumbling Soviet empire.

A decade ago, when NATO's programme Partnership for Peace was launched, former Soviet satellites rushed enthusiastically towards NATO's opened arms, expecting a permanent security protection against Russia, in case this country would change its new course of cooperation and integration with the West. And while most of the Eastern and Central European countries were still moving towards NATO-membership, instead of that threat that has in the meantime disappeared, a new one was suddenly born; global terrorism that hit the US first, and then other parts of the world, including Europe. Adjusting to such a change, NATO has changed course, counting on Russia and other states as partners in global battles that have only just begun.

This is the new situation wherein new NATO-members found themselves. While they were expecting to be part of a protected zone under the Alliance's umbrella, they became part of entanglements in Afghanistan and Iraq, facing great challenges, suffering human losses and

being hardly capable of coping with the growing dissatisfaction of their citizens at home. Moreover, many old and important European NATO allies of the United States failed to support Washington in its military campaign against Iraq's dictator Saddam Hussein. This division among the allies put new members and aspirants for NATO membership in a very difficult position to choose between two sides.

To make things even more complicated, the US as the backbone of the Alliance, has practically given up on NATO in the Iraq war, preaching instead a new philosophy, according to which the mission defines the allies, not the other way round as before. NATO thus found itself marginalized because of the reborn American unilateralism. All this happened on the eve of the biggest enlargement that NATO has ever experienced in its history; seven Central and East European countries joined the Alliance in 2004, following the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland that entered in 1999.

A serious row surrounding the Iraq war between several key European countries and the US has in the meantime slowly evaporated; many misunderstandings were also officially buried at the NATO Istanbul summit, in June 2004. It is however still unclear whether pre-emptive actions – without prior consensus among all NATO members – have been legitimised or not, and whether from now on allies will determine the mission (like until few years ago) or not. In other words, it is still not clear whether NATO has completed its new image, i.e. whether it has finally found the identity and *raison d'etre* it has been looking for ever since the end of the Cold War.

For those in South-East Europe that are eager to join this organisation, at least two new circumstances are important in this context. Both of them have become obvious despite changes that NATO has gone or will go through by the time we knock on the door. The first one is the new image of Europe after the parallel and almost identical enlargements of the European Union and NATO, and the second is a regional (Balkan) and internal political aspect of our future membership in Partnership for Peace, and in NATO.

A new zone of stability, security and prosperity

Two parallel enlargement processes have brought a new quality to the old continent; a unique zone of stability, security and prosperity to almost the entire the European territory. The Western Balkans and the majority of ex-Soviet republics are still out of this zone as non-members, but both of these groups are firmly oriented in this direction and essentially interested in becoming officially part of it. This is exactly what some pre-membership

programmes have been created for; in order to facilitate internal reforms and harmonization and preparing countries for eventual full membership. NATO's PfP has several counterparts – similar programmes of the European Union (the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAA), the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)) and together are a network of relationships of a new kind.

This EU-NATO zone in Europe does not recognise the division of labour that existed in the past; the EU is not only paying for the security provided by the US, while NATO and the US, on the other hand, perform much more functions than security alone. Economy, politics and security are thus intertwined for the first time in a new way and in principle they strengthen each other. States and societies are more secure if they are also members of the EU, while they have more chances of attracting foreign investments if they are in NATO's orbit.

The same is true for the Balkans, as well, or will become true when this region one day becomes fully covered with EU-NATO strings. The latest indicator of this came from the NATO Istanbul Summit, where NATO agreed to allow the EU to take over the military mission in BiH. In addition to that, the two organisations have made the biggest steps in common action exactly because of and for the Balkans, and all this happened during the very bitter and unprecedented transatlantic dispute they had over Iraq. For the first time official institutional ties between the Alliance and the Union are being built, primarily in order for the Balkan mission to succeed. It is equally clear to them and to us in this region that the formula for success in this part of Europe lies in their joint action. Without that, the loser will not only be the Balkans, but all of us in Europe.

Last, but not least, our interest in simultaneous integration into the EU and NATO is crucial for us also for internal political reasons. Much more than many domestic factors, this alliance between the EU and NATO guarantees the success of the reforms that we would have to implement for our own sake anyway, even if our two key allies had not existed. In other words, only within such a context – the EU and NATO orbit and eventually membership – we could hope that consolidated democracy and a strong market economy will be within our grasp. No country that went through this process did this fully on their own strength and our case will be similar in needing assistance. That's why Euro-Atlantic integration is to remain our true priority, rather than a slogan used in domestic political fighting.

EU and NATO together towards the remaining Balkan challenges

Common and determined action of the EU and NATO in the Western Balkans will remain crucial for the solution of the few but significant remaining security and political challenges in this region. Despite a great deal of stabilisation and improvement in all areas, at least three issues remain unresolved, threatening to plague the region and prevent it from further development. All three are related to state and nation building: first, BiH is still not a functional state; second, a framework of permanent relations between Montenegro and Serbia has to be determined, possibly after the referendum for independence in Montenegro; and third, a future status of Kosovo should be decided upon.

Neither of the solutions will be easy to find, but it seems certain that none of them will be found without a dedicated engagement of the international community, within which a joint action of the two key players, the EU and NATO, is essential. The need for a coordinated approach and joint action stems from several reasons.

The first is very simple and rather convincing; who else is capable of such an endeavour but those leading global players that have already committed themselves and contributed so much in this region during the last decade and a half? This point is further strengthened by the fact that the two seem to think strategically in the same way about the Balkans. This was clearly expressed in their “concerted approach for the Western Balkans”, from July 2003. This important document states that NATO and the EU share a common vision for the future of the Western Balkans meaning “self-sustaining stability based on democratic and effective government structures and a viable free market economy, leading to further rapprochement towards European and Euro-Atlantic structures”.

Moreover, as already mentioned, the EU and NATO established their official institutional ties for the first time exactly due to the Balkans. The so-called “Berlin plus arrangements” became the essence of such cooperation. The EU-NATO joint Declaration of December, 2002 puts it like this; “where NATO as a whole is not engaged, the EU, in undertaking an operation, will choose whether or not to have recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, taking into account in particular the Alliance’s role, capacities, and involvement in the region in question. That process will be conducted through the “Berlin plus” arrangements”.

Another reason for both organisations to jointly engage in the region draws on their common success and failure in dealing with crisis’s in South-East Europe and using their experiences as a pool of important lessons learned for the future. The Balkan wars from the nineties

could not have been stopped without a creative cooperation between the EU and NATO, as symbols of one predominantly soft and the other predominantly hard power, not only during the conflicts, but also in the post-conflict period.

Joint action is also important in the light of the remaining general problems the Western Balkans face: unfinished nation and state building, economic underdevelopment and the unfinished process of fully consolidating democratic regimes. Although regional ownership is another key to solving these issues, taken together these issues could be best addressed in cooperation with the two actors in question, in order to have guidance from one and the same platform. Furthermore the Western Balkans could also profit from spill-over effects of the already mentioned zone of stability, security and prosperity recently created in East and Central Europe.

Although the Balkans ceased to be a priority of US policy, there is still an ample place and need for its engagement in this region. The outgoing US could very well match at this particular moment with the incoming EU as the next prevailing force and agent of change in the Balkans.

To conclude, the EU and NATO should finish together a common job in the Balkans because some SEE nations would prefer NATO or the US to dominate in the process, while some others would rather see the EU in the driving seat.

It is important to regard this list of arguments not as wishful thinking, but as a result of a realistic analysis. If the cooperation and firm joint standing of the two key actors lacks in the nearby future, and if it is not coupled with equally dedicated efforts of the nations and states in the Balkans, a unique chance for the Europeanization of the Balkans might be lost.

SCG's participation in the Tailored Cooperation Programme and beyond

Branislav Milinkovic

Ambassador Branislav Milinkovic
Special Envoy of Serbia and Montenegro to NATO

Serbia and Montenegro has not yet been invited to NATO's Partnership for Peace because of the one remaining obstacle. That is the full cooperation with the ICTY which in this context basically means the Mladic case. However, this fact has fortunately not prevented various other forms of cooperation between SCG and NATO to emerge and to develop, although short of full participation in the PfP. As a matter of fact, it was at the NATO Summit in Istanbul in June 2004, when NATO states indicated that they are prepared to assist Serbia and Montenegro (as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina) by including these countries in "selected PfP activities". In line with that formulation and also as an expression of mutual interest for enhanced contacts, cooperation between NATO and SCG has been intensified over the last year.

A major element of this cooperation is NATO's Tailored Cooperation Program (TCP) for Serbia and Montenegro. The second annual program of this type is currently in place. While the first one, which was realised in 2004, was composed of only four seminars of a rather general nature, the second TCP, which became operational in early 2005, is much more comprehensive and diversified. It covers various areas when it comes to NATO's assistance in security sector reform, specifically in projects related to the conversion or resettlement of redundant military personal (Prizma programme). NATO also shares its expertise in civil-emergency planning and in the fight against terrorism with various partners in SCG. Also there are more possibilities for English language training for the military. Officers, diplomats and other civil servants from SCG are invited to the training courses at NATO schools, as well as to an increasing number of seminars that are organised within the framework of PfP.

It is no secret that both the scope and content of the TCP for Serbia and Montenegro are actually, wider than the cooperation that NATO has developed with some countries that are already PfP-member. It is equally important to note that the methodology with which TCP was created and implemented so far is comparable with the way in which NATO cooperates with states that are already within PfP. On the basis of NATO's initial proposal, substantial dialogue took place in September 2004. Reactions from the authorities from SCG were submitted after that. Consequently, on the basis of NATO's initial proposal and reactions, TCP was drafted by experts from the NATO Secretariat and endorsed by the North Atlantic

Council. There are enough opportunities for partners in SCG to indicate in which specific area they would like to cooperate and in what way. Major NATO partners from SCG are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence at the state union level. However, due to the specific constitutional arrangement of SCG, where some important competences are at the level of the two respective states (for instance the ministries of interior affairs) some parts of the TCP are envisaged respectively for the governments of Serbia and of Montenegro.

Over the last two years SCG also developed some very practical cooperation with NATO Maintenance and Supply Organisation (NAMSO) which has been acting as an executive agency in the implementation of two big projects in the area of disarmament. The first one, which was executed in 2004, was on small arms and light weapons. The second one, which is implemented this year, is aimed to demilitarize some 1.3 million of anti-personal landmines. Implementation of these projects is helping SCG to fulfil its international obligations in the field of disarmament. There is a big interest among NATO and PfP states to financially support these projects. Co-leading nations in the project on destruction of anti-personal landmines are Canada and Austria.

NATO's assistance in various aspects of security sector reform in the framework of the TCP and other programs is only one component of the intensified cooperation. NATO is not only a military alliance with outstanding expertise in defence-related issues and reform; it is also an extremely relevant international organisation for political dialogue on the most pressing security issues. Therefore, SCG has a vital interest to further develop political dialogue with the Alliance. NATO's Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer visited Belgrade twice (in July 2004 and in July 2005), the Foreign Minister of Serbia and Montenegro, Vuk Draskovic, addressed the North Atlantic Council in January 2005, while (former) Defence Minister Prvoslav Davinic did so in May 2005. In order to facilitate communication with the Alliance and in anticipation of an invitation for PfP the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of SCG decided to send a Special Envoy to Brussels with the rank of Ambassador, who was very well received by national delegations and the NATO Secretariat.

Dialogue was intensified on the parliamentary level as well. The state union Parliament was granted observer status within the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and its delegation regularly participates in this capacity at the NATO PA sessions. Therefore, it is regrettable that there is not enough readiness to invite more often representatives of SCG as observers to NATO ministerial and other meetings when they are held in the format of the Euro-Atlantic

Partnership Council, as was done on the occasion of the Istanbul Summit in June 2004 when President of Serbia and Montenegro Svetozar Marovic (as well as Sulejman Tihic of Bosnia and Herzegovina) were invited for the session of the EAPC.

Since the start of 2005 SCG holds the chairmanship of the so called SEEGROUP (South-East Europe Security Cooperation Steering Group) which is a unique informal regional security forum within NATO involving both BiH and SCG. It is for the first time that this forum is chaired by a country that is not yet a PfP member. As the chair of this group, SCG prepared an Action Plan for 2005 which consists of a follow-up of what has already been done and an introduction of new activities. A major activity in the first part of 2005 was a big two-day "Seminar on PfP and the PARP Experience" which was organized in May in Belgrade and hosted representatives of some thirteen NATO and PfP states and from NATO's Secretariat; the PfP members presented their experience from the first years of their participation in the Partnership. This was an opportunity for civil servants from SCG to better understand the practical arrangements of this extensive cooperation programme.

Chairmanship of the SEEGROUP is a very useful way to increase visibility of the country at NATO Headquarters and within NATO as a whole, to introduce new ideas and to learn more about working modalities within the Alliance. This was also the reason why representatives of SCG were invited to some PfP committees to report about activities of the SEEGROUP. They were welcomed by a positive response and a lot of support. This was very helpful in order to present the country as an active and responsible partner in the process of Euro-Atlantic integration even before the invitation to the PfP is actually there.

The most prominent place on the broader political agenda of dialogue between NATO and SCG is reserved for the developments regarding the Kosovo province. The reasons are obvious; KFOR is still the biggest NATO-led operation, while the position of Belgrade is extremely important since Kosovo is, from the international legal perspective and on the basis of the Security Council Resolution 1244/1999, part of SCG, while currently Kosovo is under UN administration. NATO is more or less regularly represented at the meetings of the so-called Contact Group Plus (when the EU and NATO are added to the six nations which constitute the Contact Group, namely the US, the UK, France, Germany, Italy and the Russian Federation). Surely, the UN Security Council has the most important role in the discussions regarding evaluation of standards and in possible dialogue on future status. However, NATO also wants – next to a military role – a political role in the Kosovo context.

The fact that the EU acknowledged the recent significant progress of SCG in the cooperation with The ICTY by adopting the so-called Feasibility Study for SCG, has been carefully noted in NATO. As a result, the discussion within NATO was opened in order to identify ways and means on how to support reform oriented forces in SCG on the way to full participation in PfP. Unfortunately some ideas that have been mentioned such as observer status for SCG in PfP or some sort of "PfP-light" could not generate consensus. However, there is an emerging consensus to explore possibilities on how to strengthen the existing cooperation.

How could this be done? Allies believe that the existing Tailored Cooperation Program might be more systematic and better structured to respond to the positive developments and needs regarding defence reform. Regular consultations with appropriate authorities in SCG on defence reform through the so-called Defence Reform and Cooperation Group could be developed. A New Trust Fund might be created to help defence reform. Political dialogue might be intensified. The SEEGROUP could be given a more prominent role and higher visibility. It might become a forum for discussion of relevant political topics of regional importance. The right messages should constantly be sent to the public in Serbia and Montenegro in order to increase support for Euro-Atlantic integration. During his visit to Belgrade on 18 July 2005, the NATO Secretary General presented these ideas. His visit and these proposals showed that SCG matters to NATO.

NATO'S Approach to Defence Reform in South-East Europe

By John Colston

John Colston is NATO's Assistant Secretary General for
Defence Policy and Planning, NATO HQ

NATO, through its efforts to encourage Partnership for Peace countries to adapt their defence and security sectors to current realities and requirements, under democratic control, demonstrates its genuine interest and commitment to promoting defence reform. In this context, NATO has taken a particular interest in the progress of defence reform in both Serbia and Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as supporting steps to strengthen democratic control of the armed forces, and promoting cooperation across a wide range of activities designed primarily to support the two countries in their ambitions for PfP membership. However, progress in these areas will also benefit both countries from a purely national perspective, both in advance of PfP membership, and following possible PfP membership once all relevant conditions including co-operation with the ICTY are met, by promoting the development of defence and military structures which will meet each country's needs for an affordable, accountable defence establishment which properly reflects the essential security requirements of each nation.

NATO and defence reform

Defence reform is today a necessity for virtually all countries, for reasons which are common to almost every country. This necessity reflects first and foremost the changing geostrategic situation. This is especially the case in South-East Europe. Both BiH and SCG were formerly constituent parts of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in turn surrounded by countries which were members either of NATO or of the Warsaw Pact. Today, all neighbours of the two countries are either NATO countries or aspirants for NATO membership, and they constitute no security threat to either country. Defence structures must reflect this new geostrategic reality.

Defence reform must also reflect the changing nature of the threats and challenges to security which are common to all nations. Until the end of the Cold War, nations focussed on the threat of strategic aggression and the possibility of large scale conflict. Today the reality is very different. There is no current threat of large scale conventional conflict in the Euro-Atlantic area. But that does not mean that the nations of Europe are free from risks and challenges. We must take seriously into account the risk of regional crises stemming from ethnic, religious or other differences, and a wide range of asymmetric threats, primarily the

threats which arise from terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, but also organised crime, the trafficking of weapons, drugs and human beings and other related security challenges. These 21st century threats remain serious – deadly serious – but they require different concepts, different doctrines, different structures, different equipment and different capabilities if they are to be effectively addressed.

A further requirement for reform can derive from the emergence or development of new technologies or capabilities. New technologies can represent new threats, but can also offer opportunities for military forces to achieve their objectives in new and more effective ways. The use of new technologies is often accompanied by a requirement for new concepts, and potentially even for new structures to make the best use of those technologies.

Changes in the resources available for defence may also trigger defence reform. Defence sector funding tends to be decreasing in most countries, whilst the costs of maintaining current defence structures are likely to be increasing, quite apart from the need to meet the costs of current operations and to invest in the future. As a result, nations need to re-prioritise the use of scarce resources, and address the requirement to reform and rationalise, normally through downsizing and restructuring.

Defence reform is not something that NATO advocates for its own sake, but because it reflects and supports the interests of the countries themselves, regardless of their aspirations for PfP and/or NATO membership. For countries in transition, as in the case of BiH and SCG, there is a further reason for defence reform; the need to adapt the defence sector to the requirements of a democratic state. Defence forces need to be organised and controlled by the democratically elected authorities of the state, taking account of the role of both government and parliament. Defence issues must be openly debated, not only by the military but also by the various political parties, NGOs and the media. The defence sector must be open, transparent, and fully accountable.

Unreformed militaries, especially in countries in transition, can represent a threat to stability to the extent that they are not democratically controlled and accountable. They also tend to cost significantly more than is necessary to meet the current requirements of the state, and they tend to develop a closed society mentality, reflecting fears that defence reform will lead to a loss of jobs, privileges and power. At worst, there is a risk that unreformed elements of the defence and security sector may try to undermine the efforts of the government for reform.

Some important principles

Having established the reasons why defence reform is necessary, I will now offer some thoughts on what is needed to ensure that defence reform has a chance of success – a “do-it-yourself” guide to defence reform:

- First of all, nations need to keep in mind that defence reform is a political process, and one which takes place in a political environment which will not necessarily be favourable to that process. This means that reform is not just an issue for ministries of defence; the whole of the government, and, especially foreign affairs and finance ministries, must be engaged throughout the process. It also means that a government that wants to proceed with defence reform must make sure that all political parties are regularly informed on the progress of the implementation of reform, and that they are asked to contribute constructively to the debate, so that the process goes ahead with the maximum possible degree of political consensus. Since defence reform is a long term effort, the added benefit of this approach is that it ensures that reform has a chance of surviving any changes in the political make up of the government.
- Second, nations must recognise that defence reform deals with real people, with economic, social and family interests that will be affected by any downsizing or rationalisation. If appropriate care is not taken of redundant personnel, reform will increase unemployment and discontent, and risks creating a serious social and eventually political problem. There is therefore a need, before reform is started, to ensure that plans are made and the necessary resources put aside for a respectable provision for those laid off, and for adequate arrangements for the retraining of retiring personnel to allow them to be successfully reintegrated into the job market.
- Third, similar consideration must be given to the potential economic problems created by the closure of military bases, which can mean that local communities are deprived of critically needed jobs and revenue.
- Fourth, it is essential to recognise that defence reform is a costly business. The perception that by reducing forces a nation will also reduce costs is only true, if at all, in the longer term. In the short and medium term, defence reform is likely to require a net increase in defence expenditure, as a result of the extra social costs and investment in restructuring. Because defence reform is a costly undertaking, governments planning to embark on such an effort must make sure not only that adequate funds are immediately available, but also that the funding of defence

reform remains consistent over a series of years to allow the smooth progress of the reform process and a firm basis for investment in modernisation.

- Fifth, planning is essential. Nations will require both a plan which defines the final size and shape of the armed forces, and describes the capabilities and tasks of those armed forces, so that all concerned understand that the changes and reductions are not arbitrary, as well as a management plan to deliver the process of change.
- Sixth, nations should recognise that help is available. Almost every European nation has been through the process of defence reform, usually supported by NATO. Nations still in the process of transition are not without friends and Allies who can help in this process.
- Seventh, leadership: if the process of reform is to be successful, it is essential that the political and military leadership must be actively and publicly committed to it.

Basic steps for the implementation of defence reform

In conclusion, I will describe the basic steps that should be taken in implementing defence reform, drawing on NATO's experience working with Allies and partners that have undertaken the process themselves:

- The first step is usually the conduct of a Strategic Defence Review (SDR) that aims to define the nation's view of the current geostrategic situation; to identify the various security challenges which the country will have to address; the role of the defence forces in meeting these security challenges, and hence the roles and missions the defence forces will have to undertake; the command and force structures that are required for these missions, and the capabilities and equipment required by these forces. This step provides the strategic plan for the reform process.
- The second step is to factor in the current structure and characteristics of the defence forces, and establish the changes that are required to tailor those forces to the requirements determined by the SDR. This step will define the type and structure of forces that will need to remain; those which will need to be transformed, and those which will need to be disbanded. The training requirements of the forces to be retained will also have to be defined to ensure that they are able to meet the tasks determined in the SDR.
- The third step is to cost the outcome of the SDR and the change management process, and to compare the overall cost requirement to the resources actually available. Almost invariably, this critical step will reveal that the costs required are higher than the resources available and, as a result, the early model of the future defence forces will need to be further refined to fit the existing resources.

Even if all these steps are undertaken properly, there are still risks to be managed, since the initial planning assumptions may change over time, requiring planners to go back to the drawing board to adapt the plans, resource assumptions and the timing of implementation. It is therefore essential to ensure that there is an adequate local planning capacity in place to make the necessary changes to plans, and to keep defence structures under continuous review. The country, often with the support of experts either from NATO or from friendly nations that have gone through similar processes, must develop a proper defence planning system and a team of force planners that can keep the reform process under review and plan the necessary amendments. Associated with this is the need to develop an appropriate resource management system and expertise, to allow realistic resource planning and prioritisation of scarce resources to meet priority tasks and missions.

It is in this context that Partnership for Peace can prove especially helpful, through its ability to facilitate the sharing of expertise with the many other NATO and partner nations that have already undergone these experiences and can share the lessons learned from their own efforts. In addition, Partners have the benefit of using the methodology of the Planning and Review Process (PARP) within PfP, which has been used in Partner countries for more than 10 years with great success, using a methodology and principles especially adapted from the Alliance force planning process to meet the requirements of the Partnership.

Furthermore, the cooperation programmes that have been developed for each partner nation, as well as the Tailored Cooperation Programmes which are already in place for SCG and for BiH, and which draw on elements of PfP activities, can help to support the process of developing the necessary capabilities, training and knowledge required to implement the defence reform targets that nations choose for their forces.

In conclusion, the primary importance of defence reform is not the preparation of a nation for PfP and/or NATO membership. Defence reform is the instrument through which each nation can develop forces which meet its legitimate security requirements, which it can afford and sustain, which can contribute to security and stability at the national and regional level – forces of which a country, its government, people and the military personnel themselves can properly be proud. For its part, NATO will offer all the help it can in supporting nations who undertake this challenging but rewarding process.

Defence Reform in Serbia and Montenegro

Miroslav Mladenovic

Col. Miroslav Mladenovic is Deputy Head of the Public Relations Department within the Ministry of Defence, Serbia and Montenegro

*"A dangerous across, a dangerous on-the-way,
a dangerous looking-back, a dangerous
shuddering and stopping."*

(Nietzsche)

Reform in changed circumstances

The current problems connected with the development of the security sector reform concept in post-communist societies, and also in Serbia and Montenegro, are characterised by two concurrent processes: the *first* is the redefinition and search for a new security identity by the Euro-Atlantic community (US, EU, NATO); and the *second*, are the changes in the social and political structure of the Central, South-East and East European countries.

The end of the bipolar structure of the world community was the start of a changed security configuration. Instead of preparing for a possible world war the emphasis shifted to bringing about global security. Also, several new developments and different conditions in the security sphere changed the earlier security challenges, risks and threats. This led to the need to change the structure and purpose of the armed forces.

Moreover, the events caused by terrorist activities in Western countries (apart from unipolarity) contributed to the need of redefining security systems and the search for a new security identity; this made defence reform one of the most important notions after the Cold War. In Central, South-East and East European countries reform of the armed forces became one of the conditions for full inclusion into the Euro-Atlantic community. The newly established defence systems had to develop in a situation where their example – western security structures – were also in a process of change. South-East (and other) European countries sought to implement values of model societies and mature democracies in their own armed forces, so that often, the whole process of defence reform in these societies was reduced to simple copying of the Euro-Atlantic solutions including dealing with the phenomenon of “demilitarisation”. While the previous concept of security in these societies was mostly based on the military-police component, modern perceptions of security of citizens, state and the region now take a more holistic approach by looking at economic, social, political, cultural, environmental, and finally military components.

An additional stimulus for the relatively fast acceptance of a new (though insufficiently defined) security concept resulted from the conviction of citizens of post-socialist countries that welcoming Euro-Atlantic security models means at the same time a rapid farewell to the socialist legacy and at the same time inclusion into the West.

Thus, in Serbia and Montenegro, the reform of the security sector is a result of changed circumstances which may be seen at three main levels: (i) *the international level*, disintegration of the bipolar system and change in thinking about security in NATO countries; (ii) *the regional level*, characterised by relatively successful and rapid adaptation of the majority of the neighbouring countries to Euro-Atlantic standards and requirements; and (iii) *the national level*, which is a more complicated and contradictory process within the community itself that has to face enormous economic, social and political challenges. In such a complex environment, the reform of the security sector in SCG is an extremely difficult and lengthily process which impedes in all important spheres of the social life.

The theoretician Darendorph rightfully warned (after the fall of the Berlin wall) that the post-communist regimes would need six months to adopt new constitutions, six years for economic recovery and sixty years for a change of consciousness and establishing a developed civil sector. Considering our situation, it is worth mentioning that replicate constitutions are still not changed.

Taking all this into account, we could say that the security sector is a much wider concept than the subject of our real interest, and accordingly, the goal of this study on defence reform. The analysis that follows will mainly deal with the reform of the armed forces, having in mind that this concept can be studied from a broad but also a narrow approach. In particular the focus is on the military, while in general the security sector may be regarded as all the agencies of the state authorised to carry weapons and use the force: border guards, secret services, financial police, different special and antiterrorist units, customs, prison guards etc. Practice has shown that paramilitary formations, partisan and even "private" forces that emerged during the wars, may be added to this list.

Reform of armed forces, as the basic part of the security sector, is undoubtedly one of the issues which virtually were dealt with by all government administrations and all leading and command structures of the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces of Serbia and Montenegro. Despite plans and an initial start with reforming, the fact is that these are mainly

geared towards reorganisation of the armed forces and the Ministry rather than their actual reform. Essentially, defence reform was expressed as an attempt (more or less successful) of different public institutions to carry out the restructuring of the inherited organisation, procedures, personnel, information and communication technologies, decision-making processes so that they were in line with new circumstances and initiated integration processes.

For making defence reform work there need to be favourable circumstances regarding other aspects of society. Democratic oversight, de-ideologisation and de-partisanship of the military can only be accomplished in a democratic surrounding with a strong social structure and clear values. Also, it is necessary to keep in mind that reform of the existing system is a process which cannot be realised without additional finances. In this regard it is necessary to establish a modern budgeting system. One of the first tasks in that sense is the provision of transparency of the budget and all expenditures in order to gain the necessary support from the government institutions, and of course in the first place of the citizens.

Defence reform is a complex process and assumes changes in several important fields:

- Perception and organisation of security;
- administrative and institutional;
- democratisation of civil-military relations;
- redefining the mission and objectives of the armed forces and their restructuring; and
- inclusion into the regional and global processes.

The starting point that true security must be based on the security of the individual, primarily assumes the changes in the field of human and civil rights. While according to the traditional concept, an individual is deemed safe if there are strong armed forces for the protection of his state and regional surroundings, current attitudes on that issue might be changed to the point that the citizen is safe if he or she is economically secure, politically and spiritually free and socially ensured; the military component is less significant. In that sense, perception and organisation of security should be seen as an expression of the specific cultural environment in Serbia and Montenegro. The absence of a democratic tradition in South-East Europe and the lack of a feeling of citizenship resulted in the current specific political behaviour where people are accustomed to authoritarian rule and do not expect any social assistance from the state. A change of the constitution can not erase this mindset and change the existing stereotype behaviour. Also in that line of thinking there is a significant predominance of traditional behaviour over modern civilization and social factors.

In the structure of the "collective memory of people", in this area, militancy and heroism are at the forefront in processes of democratisation and integration. The dialogue (at the highest level) has the role of a "war tool" with the aim to defeat the "enemy", not to solve the problem or to reach an agreement. New social movements, fortunately, show positive changes in this sphere and have often the ability to break through the persisting traditional mindset.

With regard to the organisational and institutional framework, there is a broad consensus among politicians in SCG that new or reformed institutions should meet the highest standards of democracy. Setting up the structure of such institutions is relatively easy (at least in comparison to other factors), but more important is the environment in which they have to perform. Economically underdeveloped and highly conflicting societies are determined by faith to some form of authoritarian regime until the internal conditions for establishing the appropriate democratic form of organisations are made. The main problem, however, which constantly levitates above all the societies in transition, is the question of a threshold of tolerance between democratic solutions on the one hand – that are introduced under the influence of mature democracies – and the non-democratic environment in which these institutions must operate. In SCG this tension is even more present because society is also characterised by a series of other problems that do not apply to other post-socialist states.

Civil-military relations

In discussing the democratisation of civil-military relations, the fact that the military is a separate social association but at the same time, a specific administrative body and as such an integral part of society should be considered. When adopting the principle of the national sovereignty in modern societies, military power, as well as all other political institutions of society (governmental bodies, state administration, etc.), are being subordinated to the political bodies expressing the will of the electorate. The principle of citizenship, on the other hand, requires that this subordination must not turn into the creation of a blind military force which would represent a weapon in the hands of the ruling elite. In this sense the military has quite a long experience with civil control but not democratic control.

In the conditions of a non-democratic political culture and insufficiently institutionalized political environment legal or illegal influence on the military is often misused in the struggle for power. In these circumstances there is a real risk that parts of the military (especially the

officer's core) are being drawn into the struggle for power and that some political institutions become captives of military might.

One of the most important ways of creating healthy relations between civil and military power, in modern democratic societies, apart from the democratic civil control, is related to the so called de-politisation of the army. It is logical that the military – as a state organisation with a clearly determined place in society and responsibilities within the framework of state institutions – must strive to a neutral position within that society. However, the notion "de-politisation" does not mean that the military should be deprived of all political awareness. On the contrary, professional servicemen must be familiar with the basics of politics, modern political systems, and of course organization of government structures in their own country. Only in that way they can follow and judge the whole of the political phenomenon in the contemporary international relations. Moreover, having an opinion on politics is something else than being partisan towards this or that political grouping. Thus, "depolitisation" does not mean depriving a soldier of his political knowledge or ideas and demanding ignorance of politics; it only means to abstain from actively participating in politics

The challenge of reform in SCG

The environment in which defence reform needs to take place is complex. There are historical factors and typical issues of civil-military relations that need to be taken into account. In that sense, there are several levels in this process that apply to the case of SCG:

- *Normative.* Expressed through insufficient harmonisation of the constitution and laws with NATO countries, as well as the necessity of adopting adequate documents relating to the regulation of defence and security.
- *Organisational.* Assuming the necessity of a functional analysis of the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff with the aim to compare the current state of affairs with that of defence arrangements in partner countries. In the case of SCG there was much overlap in functions and a number of functions were not customary for the defence and security sector. This has been largely remedied by the new organisational structure of the Ministry and the General Staff.
- *Information and technology.* The present information and communications technology is not at the satisfactory level, neither is the way in which the limited capacity is used; especially in modernisation of procedures, internal information sharing and communication among different state institutions.

- *Human resources management and development.* It is necessary to define the strategy and policy of human resource management with regard to employment, promotion, modernisation, reorientation, etc. One attempt to overcome these problems is the realisation of the Prizma programme for professional reorientation and preparation of personnel to participate in professions outside armed forces.
- *Educational.* It is necessary to make people realise that the reforms are not a threat but a chance and opportunity to create better working conditions.
- *Cultural.* It is important for MoD personnel to develop a critical way of thinking and to promote people to be pro-active and use their creativity. The Armed Forces encompasses more than only following orders.

One initiative that was taken in SCG was the establishment of a Reform Team working within the MoD which was created on the basis of an agreement between the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Ministry of Defence. The MoD Reform Team was created in December 2003 and is one of the main institutions dealing with defence reform in SCG. It is noteworthy that this team was formed on the basis of an international agreement and that the international dimension was clearly pointed out in its organisation. It is an opportunity to use the experiences of other countries in the most direct manner because there were two advisers from the United Kingdom in the composition of the Team, and also the presence of other people from abroad. The UNDP programme is a good way to show our determination in cooperation and integration with international institutions and organisations. It should also be mentioned that this Team is mainly composed of young people who were in previous work not at important positions in the Armed Forces and the Ministry.

Putting defence reform into a wider politicological context we discover that there are changed circumstances in the politics-war relations. I wish to underline the necessity of a changed approach to the problems of war, security and the military. It seems that the famous Von Clausewitz definition of *war is the continuation of politics by other means* would be more applicable to the contemporary environment if we change the word order and would say: *politics is the continuation of war by other means*.

Today the old division between the soldier and the politician is not valid any more. War is not anymore antipode to peace and its traditional characteristics significantly changed. War is waged without fronts, often without battles, and sometimes even without armed forces. In such conditions, it is certain that the military factor is also changing significantly, which makes reform a continuous process that needs attention.

Democratic Control of the Defence Sector in Serbia and Montenegro: Achievements and Challenges

By Mladen Momcilovic

Mladen Momcilovic is Parliamentary Program Manager, National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, Serbia and Montenegro

The primary goals of this paper are to state the importance and evaluate the development of parliamentary oversight of the defence sector in SCG. For some time now the concepts of a strong Parliament and efficient parliamentary control in SCG were elusive. Hence, here an attempt will be made to tackle such questions as: what are the main achievements in parliamentary oversight and democratic control of the defence sector in SCG? What are the major challenges that impede efficient oversight? What are the major Ministry of Defence (MoD) steps forward in terms of the oversight facilitation? Why a transparent and efficient budgeting system matters and why meaningful oversight is impossible without it? Why development and sustainability of an efficient communication between the Parliament and the MoD is important? And what are the measures of success?

Establishing civilian oversight of the defence sector represents one of the most difficult challenges facing many emerging democracies. A legacy of military and autocratic control of defence affairs leaves new democratic political leaders without the expertise and oversight mechanisms necessary to oversee national defence.¹ Military leaders, for their part, often lack an understanding about the role of the armed forces in a democracy and are reluctant to relinquish their autonomy. The task at hand here is to strengthen civilian expertise in defence affairs, to promote dialogue and confidence among civil, political and military leaders, and to enhance understanding about the role of the armed forces in a democratic society.

Strong oversight by parliament is an indispensable element of an effective democratic government. Legislative oversight and the work of parliamentary committees have two dimensions. First, it means holding the administration of government accountable for the delivery of programmes. And second, it requires government officials to be transparent in what they do. Put simply, transparency encourages responsible behaviour. The principle behind legislative oversight of the executive activities is to ensure that public policy is administered in accordance with legislative intent. As to this principle, the legislative function does not cease with the passage of a bill. It is, therefore, only by monitoring the implementation process that members of the legislature uncover any defects and act to

correct misinterpretation or misadministration. In this sense the concept of oversight exists as an essential corollary to the law making process.

The SCG Defence Strategy² promulgated, after much delay, in the SCG Parliament on 18 November 2005, has firmly set the country towards the international integration concerning security.³ The creation of the Defence Strategy had a troublesome path. Only after several months of public debate involving a squabble between Belgrade and Podgorica, the SCG Parliament approved SCG's rough equivalent of a National Security Strategy, the Defence Strategy. Unable to agree on a document titled 'SCG National Security Strategy,' not least due to differences in threat assessments perceived by the two republics, the Defence Strategy was the compromise solution. The goals articulated in the Defence Strategy provide direction for the Defence and Military sectors and, in the terms of the MoD, pave the way to proceed with necessary reforms. The original and controversial text in the Strategy, stating that full NATO membership is a primary goal of SCG, was modified in such a way that the question of NATO membership would be decided by referendum. This appeared to be a reasonable solution, and one that several of the former PfP member states, now NATO members, adopted as well. The strive behind this issue is a key for understanding a number of existing obstacles on the road to efficient parliamentary oversight and a defence budgeting system. Especially difficult was and still is to consolidate and strengthen an agreement amongst all stakeholders – political and economic elites – that agrees on defence reform and the efficient parliamentary oversight of the Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces (MoD/AF) because it is an important prerequisite for the SCG accession to Euro-Atlantic security organisations. In the end this accession is one of the most important pillars of the overall SCG European integration strategy.⁴

In spite of the progress made in the past year, development of effective parliamentary oversight of the defence sector and establishment of democratically structured civil-military relations (CMR) remain a major challenge. Since its formation on May 4, 2004, the SCG Parliamentary Defence Committee made a big step forward and established openness to external capacity development assistance schemes.⁵ Thus the committee recognized that education of MPs is one of the most important factors in enabling parliament to meet their defence related legislative and oversight duties and challenges. Its work was significantly constrained by the specific constitutional and political architecture and environment as well as by the absence of a tradition of democratic control and the notion of a 'weak parliament'. Illustrative of this was a point made by a Macedonian MP who put it like this "The problem lies in the fact that that the true power lies with the government, i.e. being exercised by the

legislative branch according to the Constitution. I think” he went on “this is because the political elite, consisting of electoral lists, is integrated into the government structures, and the administration consists of obedient party members. Such self-control mechanism – i.e. the internal control of the administration – transfers the actual power from the Parliament to the Government”.⁶ In spite of this unclear authority distribution, as well as the imperfect legal framework and poor staff support, the committee in SCG made an effort in acquiring practical knowledge on a wide range of topics such as: the crucial role of civil-military relations in the process of defence reform and establishment of democratic oversight; the role played by parliament in the scrutiny process; defence budgeting, just to name few. The area yet to be covered is MPs understanding of structures and functions of the MoD/AF in democratic societies. Some steps were taken in establishing communication with the MoD. Over the past period the Committee invited various MoD officials for committee hearings, and launched a series of visits to military bases. And maybe most importantly, MPs began to understand the defence budgetary process in democratic societies.

Thus, one can say that the past year could prove in the long run to be the turning point in terms of the pioneering capacity-building of parliament to perform oversight of the defence sector. Through strong commitment by parliamentarians, work, and leadership, through numerous seminars and workshops, and individual consultations, the MPs became increasingly informed and skilled to exercise parliamentary authority in conducting oversight and fulfilling their watch-dog obligations. In order to make further progress the Committee will need increased and more focused assistance.

In relation to reforms in the MoD, all achieved progress came in spite of significant constitutional, political, and material constraints in transforming the defence establishment into an institution that truly reflects the principles, practices and attitudes of democratic governance, not to mention the unfavourable heritage.⁷ At the same time the system remained closed and ideologised to a certain extent. Besides bringing about some key defence documents such as a Defence Strategy and a White Paper, and the most recent completion of a new organisational structure of the Ministry and the Armed Forces, the MoD also voiced its commitment to establish and sustain an effective working relationship with the Parliament while welcoming civilian and democratic control. In practical terms, this commitment resulted in the MoD being present at many sessions of the SCG Parliament Defence Committee, the commitment to create an office within the MoD for liaison with the Parliaments⁸, and a programme for MPs to visit military bases. These visits are well-received and necessary in democratic nations since they provide MPs with a unique opportunity to

witness the functioning of the military, and to speak with officers and soldiers. The MoD has been working hard to bring the military on board through a programme of MP visits to bases. Chief of Staff General Branko Krga welcomed the first committee group and an agreement was reached between the MoD and the SCG Defence Committee to continue these visits on a regular basis in the future. Though this looks like a modest achievement, these changes are concrete and unprecedented for defence oversight in SCG. Now special attention and support is needed to set-up the MoD Parliamentary Liaison Office.

Once established the MoD Parliamentary Liaison Office will be an important piece of the defence institutional architecture that few countries managed to establish early in the defence reform process. Some countries like Romania have such offices in all ministries. The main tasks and purpose of this office can be summed up as follows: information exchange between MoD/AF and the SCG Defence Committee, as well as with parliaments of the member republics; help prepare MoD/AF personnel for briefings or hearings whenever requested by parliaments and MPs; assistance in drafting speeches for the MoD/AF personnel that are associated with legislative affairs (i.e. legislation); offer general defence related legislative support to the parliaments; to mention a few important ones.

Besides the described improvements, MoD's declarative commitment to further development of an effective, mutually beneficial relationship with Parliament is to be tested over the success rate of a further implementation of substantial reforms geared towards increased transparency and democratic accountability, especially with regard to the budgeting process. In relation to this last point we need to step away from the practice of 'partial self-reform' (restructuring). The recent public squabble between the Serbian Ministry of Finance and the MoD over the state of MoF finances may prove to be an icebreaker. Maybe the most critical area that needs thorough reform and a firm place in the MoD vision documents – as opposed to mere restructuring and declarative reform pledges – is the comprehensive reform of the budgeting system towards the development of a modern integral and programme based budgeting system compatible to international standards. This system should be based on harmony between needs and capacities.⁹ It should be one of the highest priorities and if successful would enable efficient budgetary oversight and more efficient allocation of resources.

A lack of, or incomplete, system for transparent and efficient budgeting and the lack of reform towards the development of a programme-based budgeting system is maybe one of the gravest points in the current state of the defence reform affairs in SCG. Thus efficient

budgetary oversight is still inconceivable. A key to understanding the current strained relation between the Ministry of Finance and MoD over the defence budgeting in SCG is twofold. The *first* one is a lack of the consensually agreed National Security Strategy as explained above. And the *second* is a lack of a proper budgeting system that can be found in most if not all mature democratic systems. In the defence sector, allocation of resources for training and operations, personnel, equipment and a host of other categories should reflect the roles and missions of the AF, established during a process of national security planning. The legislative control of budgets, sometime called the “power of the purse,” should provide the civilian leadership with a key element of control over government institutions. Yet, this is not the case in the SCG, due to agreed constitutional, institutional, and financial arrangements between Belgrade and Podgorica.

Clear and efficient communication between parliament and the MoD is a prerequisite for the development of meaningful parliamentary oversight. Improvement can be observed but the SCG Parliament is yet to strengthen ties with the senior MoD leadership, and to articulate the value of these good relations through public forums, the media, and within their constituencies. Although much progress was made, MPs are yet unable to fully adept to actively soliciting opinions and consultation from sources outside of government. Their open cries for and appreciation of adequate assistance (experience and lessons learned from other democracies) ensures hope and calls for a careful coordination of any technical assistance that has a practical goal in mind.¹⁰ Ability to listen and pay sincere attention to the reality on the ground, before offering any assistance, may prove here as a critical quality of any technical assistance scheme or effort, domestic or foreign, both to the Parliaments and to the MoD.

Measurement of success in achieving these and other targets is subjective, in large parts demonstrated by the generally effective performance of the parliaments. At the same time, as the skills of MPs and staff are improved, the ability of committees to more effectively and efficiently deal with issues will result not only in increased quality of output, but also in the quantity of decisions taken. Additional tools for measuring should include surveys, direct observation of activities, increased debate in committees on defence oversight issues, and the frequency of how often such oversight hearings are conducted. Increased understanding will also be determined through discussions with MPs, and interested outside observers, greater clarity and specificity in written work, a more effective and faster ability to resolve ambiguities and fewer delays in producing legislation.

Hopefully sooner rather than later, fully effective links between the increasingly educated MPs in Parliaments and the MoD will be established, through which information will flow in both directions. The open and inclusive MoD decision-making and budgetary processes would not only win the support of the parliaments and the public and thus help MoD share responsibility for some tough decisions, but it would also benefit from additional views and expertise. The currently existing flow of information – already much improved – needs to be sustained and an efficient Parliamentary Liaison Office would be a further asset. Moreover, the assignment of defence oversight responsibilities, among various committees in parliament should also be addressed. Improved constitutional and political constraints and clarity might need revision. The MoD could help MPs with the review of defence and military regulations and policies, to ensure that sound civil-military relations are created in these guidance documents. A start has been made in SCG but a lot remains to be done.

¹ See Predrag Simic in Istvan Gyarmati (ed.), *Security Sector Governance in the Western Balkans* (2004), 177-187.

² For a copy visit http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/Serbia_and_Montenegro_Eng_2005.pdf

³ Pavle Jankovic, SCG Assistant Minister of Defence, stressed this as a particular achievement during the first session of the DRINA workshop (held in Belgrade, 13 and 14 May 2005).

⁴ A point well elaborated upon in the article 'Balkans in European Future', Belgrade (April 2005), *European Forum* http://www.becei.org/evropski%20forumi%20u%20pdf-u/Evropski_forum_4_2005.pdf

⁵ Chairman Borislav Banovic spoke at length about this issue during a seminar on 'The Role of Civil Society in the Security Sector Reform', held in Kanjiza, SCG on February 17, 2005.

⁶ Macedonian MP Talat Xhaferi, see Miroslav Hadzic (ed.), *The Role of the Parliament in Security Sector Reform in the Countries of the West Balkans*, 2004, pp 28-29.

⁷ See Predrag Simic in: Istvan Gyarmati (ed.), *Security Sector Governance in the Western Balkans* (2004), 177-187.

⁸ Pavle Jankovic, SCG Assistant Minister of Defence, stressed this point as a specific goal to be achieved during this summer, session of the DRINA workshop (held in Belgrade, 13 and 14 May 2005).

⁹ Radisa Djordjevic, 'Reform of the Defence System' on the CCMR web site [Http://www.ccmr-bg.org](http://www.ccmr-bg.org)

¹⁰ Chairman Borislav Banovic spoke about this issue during the DRINA seminar in Belgrade and during the seminar on 'The Role of Civil Society in the Security Sector Reform', held in Kanjiza, February 17, 2005.

Defence Reform, Democratic Control and the Role of Civil Society in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Denis Hadzovic

Denis Hadzovic is Secretary General at the Centre for Security Studies (CSS), Bosnia and Herzegovina

The role of civil society in security matters has been traditionally very limited. Even in consolidated democracies, ordinary citizens do not have a significant involvement in the defence and security sector. Anti-war movements or disarmament protests have been the rare occasions for the population to have a say on the strategic direction of the defence sector. The average attitude among citizens towards these issues has been mostly one of apathy. But this situation is even more aggravated in the case of countries in transition (from war to peace; from authoritarian regimes to liberal democracies). For example, in the case of post-communist countries, the role of the civil society has been diminished, not to say wiped out, after decades of repression and control by the Communist Party. Then, the armed forces were an instrument of the Party to control external security, but also internally. Instead of monitoring the use of force by the military, civil society was to be monitored by the armed forces, police and the intelligence services.

Given this state of affairs, it appeared to be a major task to give an active role to civil society in the security sector; both for local and international actors involved in the reform of the security sectors in transition countries. Not only do the role and the structure of the armed forces have to be transformed according to the procedures of a liberal democratic system; also the role of civil society has to be enhanced. This constitutes a long term process that has to provide local societies with the capacities, expertise and channels to exert an appropriate control of the armed forces.

In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina – looking back on a poor democratic tradition – there was a need to mobilize NGOs in order to make them participate in the transformation of the security sector. BiH NGOs who pertain to the security sector began serious and systematic work roughly starting in 2000. However, this was significantly later than in other states of the region.

Most university centres in the former Yugoslavia, such as Ljubljana, Zagreb, Belgrade or Skopje, had networks of research centres or institutes that continued with their work, even during the war years. Later, in the democratisation process, they served as the nucleus for

the first NGOs, by providing accumulated knowledge and personnel. Even if those centres had existed in BiH, their work and existence would have been made impossible during the war. Knowledge, experience and practice would also have been lost.

Citizens had a generally passive attitude towards participating in debates regarding security issues that needed to be dealt with. Transformation of security sectors affects entire societies, and citizens should be involved; this is one of the key aspects in order to build a modern democratic society. It took years before there was enough confidence in BiH to realize that the work of NGOs with regard to security sector issues was important. Even today, these issues are kept secret to a certain extent.

The system of higher education in security studies does not produce a surplus of experts, who ultimately affirm themselves through engagement in NGOs. In conjunction with modest NGO finances, an extremely small number of experts have been employed with NGOs as contractors. Furthermore, the limited number of experts has prevented a possible creation of at least one think tank in the security sector area. As a consequence, free competition of ideas or a market of expertise has not come to fruition in BiH.

Co-operation of military and civil experts in the preparation of defence and security documents is not at a sufficient level. Firstly, in BiH there are still remnants of the communist system, in which the military was a closed organisation. Consequences of such thinking are still present in the military; therefore the "military experts" are not willing to accept civilian expertise while at the same time they do not have adequate knowledge of the development of modern security documents. In addition, they lack knowledge of foreign languages and hence are not able to follow developments in the security field. Lately, the situation has improved by way of additional education for the military, particularly in the field of democratic control of armed forces and civil-military relations. On the other hand, BiH has civil experts on defence and security issues but they are acting individually and are not institutionally organised. Currently, there is only one non-governmental body dealing with security issues, the Centre for Security Studies (CSS) in Sarajevo.

In the pre-war system, democratic control, transparency and accountability were strange notions to the members of the parliament. Today additional efforts are made towards educating parliamentary personnel and institutional development so to create more openness to a wider public. Assistance of the international organisations, using lessons learned and sharing experiences, lead to the establishment of effective cooperation within

the civil society of BiH. Hopefully, in the coming period this practice will also be institutionalised at the academic level.

NGOs in BiH are probably of even higher importance than in other transitional states. Due to a significant lack of confidence, animosity and strongly opposed political programmes, NGOs provide opportunities for unofficial dialogue and communication among policy-makers at all levels, scholars, military personnel, representatives of different law enforcement agencies and other experts. Such activities attract interest and are mostly well attended.

When we take into consideration the role of the civil society in exercising control of the armed forces, it is possible to distinguish different roles. First, civil society exercises an indirect control of the armed forces through (elected) representatives in the executive and legislative branches. At the executive level, the minister of defence is in charge of the civilian direction, command and control of the armed forces. At the legislative level, the parliament, democratically elected, should exert oversight of the defence sector, among others, regarding the planning and budgeting of the armed forces. Parliamentary control takes place through the activities of the respective parliamentary committees, but also at the plenary sessions, if required. Indirect control by civil society is still limited since it is carried out by “civilian elites”, who sometimes have closer interests and links with the “military elites” than with ordinary citizens. Furthermore, this form of indirect control exercised by the parliament can only be endorsed or rejected by the population during elections, and usually, defence sector issues are not at the top of the electoral agenda.

Secondly, civil society may exert direct control of the armed forces and the defence sector. An active civil society (together with independent local media) plays a crucial role in raising public debate regarding security and defence issues. From the participation of the armed forces in external conflicts to the socio-economic consequences of defence reform; all different concerns can be the object of public debate. In this way, public opinion may shape the political agenda. What is more, these issues can and should be submitted to a critical public discussion so to avoid arbitrary action by the state in this area directed against the interests of citizens.

In this later role, it is also worthy to mention the crucial role of the media in linking civil society to the defence sector. The media can help to convey messages in both directions: top-down (from the political-military elites down to the citizens) and bottom-up (demands from the population to the politicians and the military). The media can contribute to the

development of a critical debate and dialogue amongst the population, also serving as an educational agent. One of the problems associated with control of armed forces – also affecting other areas of the security sector – refers to the necessity to make the right for transparent and accurate information and the need to maintain secrecy in some vital areas compatible. These limitations affect not only the media's freedom of expression but also parliamentary control of armed forces. How and where to establish the line between what can and cannot be said is not easy. It will be the result of a compromise between a responsible civil society and civil-military elite respectful of democratic principles.

Considering the delay in the promotion of effective civil society, reforms that have occurred within the security sector until 2001, passed without any significant prevalence from local civilian input. It's important to mention that those reforms are mainly performed under auspices of the international community, through the presence of international organisations in BiH (NATO, OSCE, and UN) and with limited influence from the local authorities. Fortunately, in recent years civil-society organisations, as well as some of the political parties, played an increasingly significant role in the promotion of democratic values and international standards considering civil-military relations, transparency and accountability of governmental structures in the security sector.

Prior to 2001, BiH suffered from a lack of state institutions dealing with the security sector. In accordance with the provisions of the Dayton Peace Agreement, only two constitutional institutions were in charge of security issues, namely the Presidency of BiH and the Standing Committee for Military Matters (though mainly an adversary role). Today, four years later, BiH has established all institutions at the state level that enable proper functioning of the security sector. Not all of them are running at full capacity in performing their role but the institutionalisation of the sector is complete.

Establishment of these institutions, in order to fulfil the international obligations and integrate into Euro-Atlantic structures, was achieved through substantial international assistance, and sometimes pressure towards the local political elites. Absence of political will to conduct the necessary reforms created space for civil society to advocate and lobby for the promotion of their activities. The activities that were undertaken represented for the first time the voice of the civil society. This development helps to create a democratic environment where credible partners in government and civilians jointly pursue the promotion of Euro-Atlantic values.

Despite the fact that it is very difficult to measure the real impact of civil society in its progress towards the stated goal of democratisation and integration, it is recognised that civil-society – without exaggeration – succeeded to provide a platform for open debate and connections between political leaders. Sometimes the more powerful actors within the security sector failed to bring them together. Representatives of NGOs working in the field, can and do collect and analyse information without compromising their political neutrality and by operating through discrete channels.

Informal gatherings organised by NGOs such as workshops, seminars and conferences, enable the executive, legislature and military to openly share their views on many aspects within an informal environment. These forums also represent the opportunity to introduce to the governmental institutions modern views on security and allow them to exchange the experiences with their neighbouring countries and other regional partners. Alongside the educational acknowledgment, the informal contacts enable them to create a friendlier atmosphere between themselves, which is one of the main conditions for real reconciliation of a war torn society.

When we consider the role of the media in exercising democratic control of armed forces, for a long time civil society has suffered from subjective reporting. The narrow-minded authorities in charge of providing adequate and appropriate information to the public regarding security issues were driven to limit media coverage. Next to this, immediately after the war, the population did not take any interest in military affairs; due to the long-standing exhaustion of the war the public interest had declined. The media in BiH has been the subject of major outside assistance for years. Huge efforts have been undertaken to develop the independent media. Besides interventions by the High Representative from time to time, positive changes can be detected with the intention to reach international standards.

Politicians are responsible to the public for their decisions and actions, and they are subject to appropriate control. Also, they must be transparent in making decisions, as well as in their activities. The government is not solely responsible for this. The media can also be blamed for inadequately developed transparency. The main reasons for this are: insufficiently educated journalists, only partial reporting on security issues; and closeness of particular media with a specific political circle. Personal economic interest of the owners of newly established media companies and the orientation towards more sensational topics led to a situation where the public could only be informed about corruption, political games and scandals that occurred within the security institutions.

Today, the media most frequently writes about the need for BiH to participate in the PfP programme. All political parties agree about the necessity to participate in this programme. Given the dispersion of political parties in BiH, their ideological background, political programme and other differences, it is impossible that they are all sincere in expressing this view. However, given that journalists in BiH support the pro-PfP view, an atmosphere has been created where journalists with different ideological perspectives are pushing for PfP membership. At the same time the media is not critically considering how to obtain this goal. When media and security are concerned, international assistance is still very desirable and necessary; both from a technical and contents point of view.

To promote the role of civil society in security and defence, several initiatives are helpful. From the creation of formal institutions and procedures to allow civil organisations to express their concerns – such as the ombudsman – to informal initiatives to promote community activities, workshops, seminars and other defence-related initiatives. These activities should be undertaken not only at the national level, but also at the sub-regional and regional levels, in order to promote a fruitful exchange of views and experiences. In this regard, the DRINA project has contributed in the development of regional cooperation on the defence reform issues.

As mentioned earlier, changing the mindset of civilian elected officials, military professionals and civil society representatives regarding the relationship between the civilian and military sectors is a long term process. Workshops like the ones organised within the DRINA project have put the emphasis on the importance of developing a dialogue and critical debate about these issues with a long-term educational goal. The objective is to create civilian expertise on these issues – independent of the political elites – in order to increase the effectiveness of civilian control. Defence issues should be included in the agenda of local NGOs and community groupings since they have a substantial impact on human security. They cannot be kept aside and alienated. They should contribute to develop an informed and critical debate. Only by developing local expertise and awareness about these issues, will the sustainability of the reforms be guaranteed.

Investment in the younger generation – one of the main objectives of DRINA – is essential for the future and long term development of BiH. Promoting a new generation of political leaders and their inclusion in the decision-making process can bring forward the much needed sustainability of peace in the region. Regional stabilisation is the key for social and

economic prosperity and in that sense the aim of the DRINA project. Also by strengthening the bilateral cooperation between two neighbourhood countries is more than a desirable move in achieving that goal. Individuals and groups – especially young people and women – after having been educated abroad are often not desired in BiH's institutions, but certainly should be. In many cases they represent a threat or discontinuity for the powers that be. Prolonged follow-up or support to their professional and academic development should be a constituent part of these projects.

The DRINA project represented one of the bright examples of cooperation of foreign and local organisations with common objectives, and with an equal participation by all actors in planning and the implementing stage of the project. However, if one intends to make a real difference in BiH in the long-run, one's efforts should be focused on the area of conflict analysis and conflict management. Many programmes faded away before having reached their goals due to the shift of priorities by the international community. Programmes are not sustainable without prolonged foreign support. Training programmes that create and train domestic trainers are needed. If developed, BiH's conflict analysis and conflict management capacities should usefully serve all the identified target groups and create a framework for early action with democratic standards.

Direction and scope of a long-term cooperation depend, first and foremost, on the strategies chosen by foreign partners and their resources. BiH is still the state that attracts a lot of sympathy and significant attention for efforts made in the DPA implementation process. Positive developments in BiH are of importance for the region, Europe and for international peace and security in the modern threat context. BiH needs reliable long-term partners. Equally important is that BiH has reached a level of internal consolidation and should be considered as a reliable long-term partner for outside institutions. BiH is more and more the fertile soil in which efforts yield good and tangible results.

BiH is certainly a very complicated state concerning constitutional arrangements which is clearly reflected in the security field. That is why reforms in the security sector are taking much longer than in other states of South-East Europe. However, a number of positive changes have occurred recently, and future reforms look promising. BiH is on its way to joining other South-East European countries on the path of integration into Euro-Atlantic security structures.

The Road to PfP Membership: Development and Enhanced Cooperation between BiH and NATO

Sven Alkalaj

Ambassador Sven Alkalaj is the Permanent Representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina to NATO

It is essential to take a step back into history in order to have a better understanding of today's situation as well as for understanding why BiH is so keen on continuing its cooperation with NATO and eventually becoming a member of the Alliance.

The basis for the first NATO engagement in the former Yugoslavia was established on the North Atlantic Council (NAC) meeting in Oslo 1992. It was decided that NATO would support the peace operation led by the OSCE. In line with decisions of the UN Security Council, NATO had been engaged from 1992 to 1995 in control of the arms embargo, control of the UN banned flights zone and in the air support of UNPROFOR. After the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords, IFOR was established in order to implement military provisions and provide conditions for the implementation of the civilian provisions of the Agreement. Some 60.000 soldiers from NATO and eighteen other non-NATO countries were deployed under the command of NATO's SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander Europe). In 1996 IFOR was replaced by SFOR with 31.000 troops. Stabilisation forces continued to be active with the implementation of the Dayton Agreement and due to the improved situation the number of troops was decreased to 7.000. It is important to note that there has not been a single casualty from hostile action against NATO troops.

NATO efforts have yielded remarkable results. The most obvious one has been the establishment and maintenance of a safe and secure environment in which people and institutions of BiH can develop to their full potential. Also, NATO forces demonstrated the philosophy of the Euro-Atlantic community; how partners and allies work together to achieve common goals. This has helped us to understand that modern armed forces must have high standards using well-developed and well-practiced procedures. They have shown us repeatedly the importance and value of professionalism and dedication.

The Final Communiqué of the Istanbul Summit included several statements that were related to BiH. Once again, NATO emphasized its commitment to peace and stability in BiH and preservation of territorial integrity and sovereignty of all countries in the region. NATO also declared its commitment to remain involved in all activities until peace and stability are firmly

established and up to the time when all countries become members of Euro-Atlantic structures. Due to the progress achieved, NATO decided to terminate its mission and to hand it over to the EU. However, NATO took the decision to remain present in BiH with its Headquarters in Sarajevo. Progress in defence reform was commended and support for its continuation was given since it is one of the main preconditions for PfP membership. In order to improve cooperation between NATO and BiH, it was decided to determine the Embassy of one of NATO member countries in Sarajevo as a contact embassy. The Embassy of Greece has become the contact point for NATO-BiH relations.

In December 2004, the SFOR mission was terminated and transferred to the EU-led mission Althea. NATO has remained active in BiH providing assistance to BiH institutions concerning a very demanding defence reform process, but also to assist in the fight against terrorism and to exchange intelligence with the EU Mission, and help in search for individuals indicted for war crimes.

Partnership for Peace is an initiative introduced by NATO at the Brussels Summit Meeting in 1994. Its aim is to enhance stability and security throughout Europe. The Programme focuses on defence-related cooperation but goes beyond dialogue and cooperation to create a real partnership between each partner country and NATO. In July 2001 the Presidency of BiH issued a declaration on the readiness of BiH to become a member of PfP. NATO gave recommendations on necessary reforms to be pursued within the defence sector among which the most important were: new legislation; establishment of an authority on the state level that will be responsible for defence issues; establishment of a transparent process of defence planning and budgeting; development of democratic control and parliamentary oversight of the armed forces; a common military doctrine and training standards; and the creation of armed forces in accordance with NATO standards. The majority of the preconditions have been met; still many of them are being implemented. It is important to emphasize that all political actors in the country have been mobilized with the aim to fulfil the requirements and bring BiH into PfP. The cooperation with the Hague Tribunal has been improved substantively and further continuation of the cooperation is necessary in order to fulfil the last political precondition for PfP membership.

It is not a question *whether* but rather *when* BiH will become a member. Authorities and institutions of BiH have constantly worked to be well prepared and ready for the PfP membership once that all conditions are met. BiH has been continuously involved and has participated in a number of activities foreseen by the TCP that was approved by NAC. The

support of NATO has been remarkable and it will continue until full fledged membership is achieved.

The existing Mission of BiH to NATO in Brussels – that is for the moment attached to the Embassy of BiH to Belgium – is the embryo of the future BiH Mission that will be located at the NATO HQ as soon as BiH joins PfP. The Mission has been involved in organising a number of visits of high-level officials of BiH to Brussels and is very engaged in activities that derive from the TCP for 2005. The representative of the Mission attends session of the SEEGROUP which is an open forum where countries from the region as well as representatives of NATO countries discuss defence and security challenges in the South-East European region, regional cooperation, give information on current situation within countries of the region and take part in different group projects. However, the Mission needs to be strengthened with additional personnel in order to be prepared to participate in various activities and execute plans that will result from the membership in PfP.

The mutual interest of BiH and NATO is to make all conceivable preparations before achieving formal membership. Together with the NATO staff, the Mission and authorities of BiH have been working on a Security Agreement between NATO and BiH, which defines the exchange of classified information. The Agreement itself is created for partner countries, which BiH is to become when it joins PfP. It is a clear signal from NATO that it expects BiH to formally become a partner country very soon. At the same time, we could consider it as recognition for all the efforts and progress accomplished in reforms, especially in the defence sector.

The implementation of the TCP for 2005 has already begun. Study trips, workshops, seminars, roundtables concerning eleven areas of cooperation have been organised by NATO with the support of member and partner countries. The programme is aimed to familiarise BiH representatives with different topics, such as fight against terrorism, border management and control, lessons learned by countries that recently joined the Alliance, necessary first steps for BiH after the joining PfP, exchange of experiences on democratic oversight and control of the armed forces, defence policies and concepts, equipment standardization and codification systems, retraining and reintegration of former military personnel, etc. The programme includes participation of individuals from BiH in NATO School courses, the NATO Defence College and language courses that are organised in BiH. Appropriate representatives from BiH will be invited to take part in some of the PfP activities as observers. The mentioned events have been attended by a wide audience

starting with representatives of the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH, the Defence Reform Commission, the Ministry of Defence, Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Security, media representatives, NGOs and others. Moreover, NATO invited representatives of the Armed Forces of BiH to take part as observers in the NATO/PfP exercise Cooperative Best Effort 2005, which took place in Ukraine, from in June 2005, as well as in the NATO exercise Cooperative Key, that took place in Bulgaria, in early September. The Programme is of a great importance to BiH, also because it gives an opportunity for a relevant audience to get in touch with their counterparts from other countries and discuss various topics. Furthermore, BiH has a unique chance to gather knowledge and experience of others in order to avoid their mistakes and to follow good examples on its way to PfP membership.

Language skills are the main precondition of the interoperability within the PfP family. A big challenge in the near future is to overcome these barriers. This issue will be treated under the TCP flag, but next to that local authorities have to make efforts on their own and provide for language training and get people ready for their future tasks. What is needed is a long-term language training strategy that should result in enabling various representatives of BiH to easily communicate with their counterparts and execute their duties within PfP. Also, the NATO Public Diplomacy Division should be supported to continue with programmes in educating representatives from BiH about PfP and NATO.

The first thing that needs to be done after the invitation to join PfP is to review and update current the Presentation Document that indicates the steps that will be taken to achieve the political goals of Partnership, the military and other assets BiH intends to make available for Partnership purposes and the specific areas of cooperation which BiH wishes to pursue jointly with NATO. Based on the Presentation Document, an Individual Partnership Program (IPP) will be created by joint efforts of BiH and NATO, on the basis of BiH requirements and priorities. Priority areas would be those that would enable adoption of control and command standards, communication and information systems, planning and budgeting, resource management, training and equipping of armed forces. It is believed that by doing so, BiH would achieve internal and external interoperability as well as operational capabilities to execute different missions.

We should not forget or underestimate the role of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, which is very important in the whole process of joining PfP. The active role and participation of the delegation from the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH in this process has been highly commended.

BiH is a small country with limited military assets. What BiH needs to do is to decide what will be its field of specialization that could be offered to the Alliance and partners and the contribution to world peace and security. The unit for destruction of unexploded military assets of the Armed Forces of BiH, with 36 soldiers, went to Iraq for a peace mission. BiH could find niches alike and develop its capabilities. By “exporting security” BiH sends a clear message to NATO that it is ready and mature enough to join PfP and NATO. Not in order to become a member of NATO, but for the sake of peace and security as envisaged in the PfP Framework Document of 1994: “The Partnership is established as an expression of a joint conviction that stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area can be achieved only through cooperation and common action. Protection and promotion of fundamental freedoms and human rights, justice and peace through democracy are shared values fundamental to the Partnership”.

Bosnia and Herzegovina and NATO

Patrice Dabos

Patrice Dabos represents the Public Diplomacy Division,
NATO HQ

The DRINA project is an excellent occasion to reassert the main objectives of NATO as far as cooperation with BiH is concerned. NATO has been deeply involved in the recent history of BiH and stays strongly committed to secure the way BiH is taking towards democracy. The Alliance knows and understands that the road to democracy is a hard one and wants to assist as much as possible.

Last year during the NATO summit in Istanbul many thought BiH would join Partnership for Peace. This possibility raised great expectations. NATO fully understands the disappointment that was apparent in BiH when it appeared that membership was to be delayed. The position of NATO's members was not always very well understood and also today is an opportunity to further explain. Moreover, I will briefly go into future cooperation between NATO and BiH.

Let us start of by going back to the Istanbul summit communiqué, which clearly stated the reasons for this delay and the way to overcome the difficulties that arose from the present situation. The final communiqué on PfP and BiH:

§ 7 explains: "The Alliance remains committed to peace and stability in the Balkans. While welcoming improvement in cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) we stress that all countries must cooperate fully with the ICTY, in particular in bringing to justice all those who are indicted by the Tribunal in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1503 and 1534".

§ 8 recalls: "NATO's long term political commitment to Bosnia and Herzegovina remains unchanged".

§ 33 states: "We look forward to welcoming Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro into the Partnership for Peace once they have met the established NATO conditions. We want them to succeed in joining the Euro-Atlantic partnership and will assist them in this endeavour. We are prepared to assist the countries by including them in selected PfP activities. Each country will be judged on its own merits to the road to PfP".

§ 34 says: “We welcome BiH’s significant progress in defence reform, a key condition for PfP membership to cooperate fully with ICTY is a fundamental requirement for the country to join PfP”.

BiH – ICTY cooperation

So, NATO’s assessment comes down to two difficulties regarding BiH’s bid for PfP membership: the relations with the ICTY and defence reform. It may seem difficult for most people in BiH to see that accession of their country to PfP is dependent on a prerequisite which is out of the reach of their individual behaviour; the apprehension of war criminals and extraditing them to an international court located in the Netherlands. Most citizens rightfully feel that they cannot be held responsible for the present situation and they fear that the problem will not be solved in their own lifetime. Nonetheless the issue must be put in clear terms; NATO does not want to punish but wants to see that justice is done according to international law. Those individuals indicted will be in the position to defend themselves, they will have their say, they will be able to plead and be assisted by lawyers. They will have a fair trial and justice shall have the last say. The trial will be open and everybody will be able to know how things are dealt with and what really happened.

It is an absolute necessity that the state of BiH shows it has the capacity to arrest indicted persons suspected of war crimes in order to further the process of implementing democracy. The BiH authorities need to show the people that they are capable of this task and send these people to the ICTY. The earlier decisions must be put into effect. In the end citizens of democratic states should have the feeling that law is respected in their own country and that other states care about the situation in their country. In that respect NATO’s decision in Istanbul is a way to assist BiH to fulfil its own commitments. It is the recognition that BiH is a democratic state where the rule of law prevails.

NATO’s claim is not illegitimate; there are clear indications that some elements are helping a few of those indicted to escape arrest in and out of BiH. These elements often claim to be acting for the good of their fellow citizens, but in effect they are harming their country. They cannot claim to be true patriots and they keep BiH out of a democratic future. Moreover, one of the main purposes of the trials is to show the reality of the war crimes and to prove that they were not purely ‘facts of war’ but criminal deeds with personal responsibilities. NATO cannot and will not trespass on its own principles, which are the principles of democracy.

Defence reform

Cooperation with the ICTY is not the only condition for PfP accession. Reform of the defence system is also a prerequisite. Two points are important in this respect: the first is the civilian and democratic control of all the armed forces. The second – and at the same time a pre-condition for democratic control – is the organisation of a ministry and a general staff at the state level of the state, which has effective powers over the whole military apparatus. These bodies must effectively control all the BiH armed forces. The entity ministries and general staffs are not the appropriate level for NATO to cooperate with; NATO works in first instance with states, not so much with provinces, districts, autonomous republics within states or entities for that matter.

NATO is aware of the difficulty of the task and recognises the tremendous job already achieved. Everyone at NATO is fully aware that time is needed. That is why the Alliance remains committed to provide support and assist with this task. When SFOR was completed, NATO decided to stay in BiH with the main purpose being to assist in defence reform issues. Among other things, NATO has appointed a deputy chairman to the Defence Reform Commission. It is in the interest of both entities in BiH that the whole range of state's powers are at the state level, not the entity level. Effective democratic control of the military can only be exercised at the state level. It is not only a prerequisite for PfP; it is a necessity for democracy that NATO points out.

These two prerequisites are the conditions of building a robust democratic state. That is why NATO would be wrong to compromise on them. However, apprehension of war criminals must be performed right now, whereas defence reform is a medium term process. NATO sees that defence reform has already reached a point of no return and at the same time acknowledges that this process can not be fully implemented before accession to PfP.

The Tailored Cooperation Process (TCP)

Though NATO members assessed in Istanbul that PfP accession minimum requirements are not yet met, nevertheless, they insisted on strengthening cooperation with BiH. They decided to make a new step in cooperation with the start of the Tailored Cooperation Programme. This TCP has been proposed to BiH (and Serbia and Montenegro) as a preparation for PfP membership. It is not a substitute; it is the start of a process to bring the country to the point of joining PfP and eventually NATO. The TCP has been exactly tailored to fit with BiH needs with the aim to go further. Thus it has a lot of practical activities and allows for a substantial

level of cooperation. Moreover, through the TCP, BiH has more activities with NATO than some full PfP members.

Some TCP activities are:

- Items related to defence institutions; assistance for organisation and planning for democratic oversight of defence and for budgeting.
- Counter-terrorism and military intelligence initiatives. BiH should develop, in cooperation with NATO a modern capacity to fight terrorism.
- The defence budget; NATO can assist BiH in developing effective and modern ways of budgeting for defence including implementation and the monitoring of defence spending.
- Modernisation of the forces; retraining and reintegration of former military personnel. One of the aims of PfP is to allow Central and East European countries to downsize and modernise their armed forces. With TCP, BiH will benefit from the same process.
- There are also activities ear-marked to “eventual PfP accession” which include for instance language training. These activities are clearly an indication of the will of NATO to seriously consider BiH as a full-fledged partner.

NATO hopes that BiH will make full use of the TCP activities and to conclude I want to state again that NATO for its part is ready to answer clearly and positively to any request from BiH which will help to ensure the building of a democratic and peaceful state. In the end we should not forget that the future of BiH is in its citizens' hands. That is the essence of democracy. The process may be long and has to be monitored carefully. But NATO's members are optimistic because they can see that the most important changes are already made; the restoration of the peace, the fulfilment of most international obligations and the will to achieve democratic reforms of the state, put BiH on the way to ensure the best possible future for all its citizens.

Defence reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Brane Jankovic

Brane Jankovic (LTC) is Head of the NATO/PfP Section, International Cooperation Department, Ministry of Defence, Bosnia and Herzegovina

This contribution to the DRINA project will mainly focus on three issues. First the distribution of powers and responsibilities, as stipulated in the Law on Defence (2003); secondly attention will be devoted to strengthening civilian structures for oversight of defence in Bosnia and Herzegovina; and lastly BiH's road to PfP membership will briefly be discussed. All three parts together are part of the bigger picture of defence reform in BiH.

The legal and organisational framework

The Law on Defence of December 2003 defines responsibilities and authorities in the defence sphere in BiH. The BiH Presidency makes decisions with consensus concerning questions of (i) war; (ii) emergencies; (iii) deployment of Armed Forces abroad; and (iv) empowering the Minister of Defence for the use and deployment of the Armed Forces in any military or humanitarian operation.

The Minister of Defence has the following organisational and administrative responsibilities that are subject of the supreme command and control of the Presidency of BiH:

- Issuing directives, rules and orders, regarding the organisation, administration, training, equipping, allocation (positioning) and use of the Armed Forces (AF) of BiH in order to ensure a maximum of interoperability, both within the AF of BiH and in cooperation with NATO.
- Developing the defence budget of BiH in accordance with the provisions of the Defence Law.
- Issuing approval for spending from the state budget.
- Representing BiH on an international level regarding defence issues.
- Advising the Presidency on the structure of the AF of BiH.
- Establishing strategic plans for armed conflicts, peace support operations and reacting in case of natural and man made disasters.
- Recommending appointments and promotion of Generals.
- Drafting of the common defence policy document.
- Planning and auditing of all intelligence activities of the Armed Forces of BiH.
- Proposing military attachés and liaison officers in the diplomatic missions of BiH abroad to the Presidency.

- Overseeing negotiations, agreements and transactions of the Armed Forces at state and entity levels.

Moreover the Minister of Defence has the following command responsibilities and authorities that are also subject of the supreme command and control of the Presidency of BiH:


- Issuing mandatory instructions to the Chief of Joint Staff for positioning and use of any unit of the Armed Forces of BiH.
- Issuing mandatory instructions to the Chief of the Joint Staff for activating the reserve units and reservists in accordance with law.
- Issuing instructions for the position or use of any part of the Armed Forces of BiH with the purpose to assist in civil protection in reaction to disasters and emergencies.
- Performing command and control of both strategic and operational intelligence affairs under auspices of the Armed Forces.

Furthermore the Minister of Defence has the authorization to supervise and inspect the Armed Forces of BiH. The Minister may employ inspectors in order to confirm if all procedures and practices in the military are according to the law and so also to promote transparency. Most importantly, the Minister is fully accountable to Parliament and its Defence Committee. Upon their request, he will appear and report on matters that are part of the responsibility of the MoD.

Ministries of Defence on the entity level are responsible for:

- Recruiting professional military personnel for the Armies on entity level.
- Regulating compulsory service and conscripts in accordance with directives of the Minister of Defence of BiH.
- Organising, equipping and sustaining units of the entity level Armed Forces as parts of the BiH Armed Forces in accordance with instructions of the Minister of Defence of BiH.
- Training of the Armed Forces in accordance with the doctrine, tasks, missions, conditions and standards approved by the BiH Minister of Defence.
- Consulting the Minister of Defence with regard to budgetary planning for the Armed Forces in accordance with the Defence Law.
- Ranking and promotion of military officers below the rank of General.
- Coordination of activities in creating and updating defence planning as part of the national defence planning.

- Planning mobilisation of the Armed Forces in accordance with the Defence Law.
- Maintenance of buildings and other facilities of the BiH Armed Forces.
- Providing communicational support for civil protection in accordance with both state and entity laws.
- Planning and organising scientific and research projects of importance to BiH defence.
- Recommendation of candidates for the rank of Brigadier Generals to the Minister of Defence.



Organisational structure of defence management in BiH

Within the current system there is an administrative and operational chain of command. The administrative chain of command has the BiH Presidency on top, then the BiH state level MoD, and then the entity level MoDs and General Staff's at the bottom of the chain. Next to this there is also an administrative chain of command that has the entity Presidents on top (similar to the National Guard in the US) but their authority over the respective MoDs is rather weak (that's why lines are dotted). In accordance with law and several regulations, the logistics and training issues are being addresses through the administrative chain of command. The operational chain of command bypasses entity level MoDs and Supreme Commands (General Staff's of both entities) and is linked directly with operational units for the execution of operations. The "A" units consist of two air force regiments (in both entities) and three mechanized brigades (two in the Federation and the one in RS). More than fifty

percent of personnel (manpower) are part of the “A” units and their operational/combat readiness is much higher in comparison with other units. One should keep in mind that they are still dependant on entity level MoDs with regard to logistics and finances. (The US National Guard is under partial authority/formal command of the Governor of a particular State, nonetheless making use of the federal budget.)

Progress made in BiH towards strengthening civilian control structures

Positive developments:

- The establishment of the Parliamentary Defence Committee and the start of work including visits of the units of the BiH AF.
- Downsizing of the AF through early retirement of a significant part of the high-ranking officers core.
- The establishment of a national MoD and determining who decides about what.
- Increased media attention for defence issues and increased openness by the military structures of BiH on these subjects; less military secrets.

Improvement necessary:

- Due to downsizing programmes many people lose their job without having any social benefits coming to them (housing, health insurances, and retirement).
- There are no military or veteran associations, trade unions or social organisations.
- Establishing NGOs, pressure groups or otherwise is not in any way encouraged by the executive, legislature or public in general.
- There are no established connections between military personnel and elected representatives except for a few irregular visits of MP's to the barracks.
- Professional members of the Armed Forces have difficulty addressing issues at the national MoD or at the entity level departments.
- Regardless of all the attempts to unify both entity level Armed Forces' and establish one MoD, people are still disregarded; salaries, housing, health and life insurance, and other social issues are still under the authority of the entities.

Defence reform in BiH in light of PfP accession

In July 2001 the BiH Presidency officially stated its willingness to join the NATO PfP programme. NATO responded by requesting from BiH to fulfil the following requirements:

- To adopt a BiH security policy;
- to centralise command and control of the Armed Forces' in BiH;

- to implement democratic, parliamentary control and supervision of the Armed Forces on the national level;
- to realize full transparency of defence policy and budgets;
- to develop a joint doctrine and standards for training and equipping of Armed Forces and organising joint training and exercises by the FB&H Army and the RS Army.

Next to this there is of course the demand to fully cooperate with the ICTY and to arrest those who are indicted for war crimes. Also BiH has to complete manning the state level defence institutions (in April about 88 percent of all positions was filled). It is important here to take the “national (ethnic) key” into account since this is an extremely sensitive topic; people from the three ethnic groups in BiH must be able to eventually fully trust the national institutions, especially in the field of security. Therefore, they are all three more than ready to send their representatives to these institutions. The political dimension of this issue is clearly more important than the pure professional aspects of manning institutions. Taking the political will of politicians into account and looking at the achieved results in defence reform, one could argue that the transfer of power from entity to state level is not as problematic as before. The current mood among politicians and the public is favourable in this respect. It is important that the new state institutions are legally and operationally ready to take their responsibility, but also that they deal with unresolved problems especially regarding social and human rights of the current and former members of the AF; status, retirement, pensions, housing etc.

Conclusion

The BiH Armed Forces must be well organised, resemble those of allied countries' forces and become part of NATO and EU forces. The BiH AF should be well trained, equipped and prepared for missions all around the world to contribute to peace and security. That what was achieved in NATO member states with respect to restructuring the armed forces to meet new challenges must simply be copied by BiH only taking a few specific BiH circumstances into account such as very clear messages from public opinion. Eventually, only a small and professional military that is prepared and operates in accordance with NATO/PfP standards can be fully acceptable to the majority of the citizens of BiH. Regardless of the violent past and the remaining difficulties between the three main ethnic components of BiH, all three agree that first PfP is a priority and secondly that the future of BiH is in NATO and other Western institutions.

Defence reform in BiH and SCG: Possible Sharing of experiences and the Potential for Further Cooperation

By Christian Haupt and Daniel Saracino

Christian Haupt is Head of the Parliamentary Section, Department of Security Co-operation of the OSCE in BiH and Daniel Saracino is Implementation Assessment Analyst at the Defence Reform Commission Secretariat, BiH

Notwithstanding the recent conflicts in the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRJ) during the nineties, numerous possibilities for exchanging experiences and fostering cooperation between BiH and SCG can be identified. The following list of general facts encompasses the reasoning behind the view that there is potential for more intensive cooperation.

- For almost 50 years both states belonged to the same federal state, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
- Many officers currently serving in the military structures of BiH and SCG have served in the Yugoslav Peoples Army (JNA) and underwent the same education, training and often worked together acquiring the similar professional experience.
- The absence of a language barrier represents an important practical precondition for intensive information exchanges and sharing of experiences through direct communication.
- Until recently an intensive cooperation program was maintained between the Army of Republika Srpska (VRS) and the Yugoslav Army (VJ), which provided military education, training and financial assistance to the VRS. With the formation of state level defence institutions in BiH this former cooperative relationship established in the past may now be tailored to benefit all of the new AFBiH.
- The constitutional and legal framework of the SFRJ was the starting point for the development of the military sector in BiH and that of SCG. In both countries the reform of the defence sector requires further detailed adjustment of inherited and, in the meantime, modified legal regulations.
- Both countries have repeatedly expressed their intentions to implement essential reforms to further Euro-Atlantic integration and in particular their aims to become members of PfP, NATO, and the EU. These shared political goals have generated similar modes for reforms concerning the security sectors in each country.

As a formal precondition for cooperation in military and security matters, the Councils of Ministers of both BiH and SCG prepared a Proposed Agreement on Cooperation, which was accepted by the BiH Presidency at its 70th session on 23 February 2005. Broad support from the BiH Parliamentary Assembly in the ratification process can be expected, and upon completion of the formal procedure the Agreement should foster the following areas of cooperation (Article 3 of the Draft Agreement):

- Exchange of experiences in meeting the requirements for accession to the PfP.
- Cooperation between the defence industries and institutions in research and development.
- Reform of state security and armed forces.
- Exchange of documents on years of service in the former JNA.
- Exchange of documents on housing and related issues of former JNA members.
- Exchange of documents for the purpose of solving other status issues of former JNA members.
- Training of the Armed Forces for participation in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations.
- Implementation of the Dayton Accords through the regional arms control process.
- Cooperation in the fields of science and technology.
- Disaster management.

Despite numerous similarities and favourable presumptions for fruitful cooperation between BiH and SCG, due attention should be paid to certain essential differences which do not allow for a carbon copy replication of the experiences already gained in BiH.

First, the unique constitutional and legal system in Bosnia and Herzegovina allowed until recently the existence of two separate entity armies.¹ Consequently, clear state level competences were lacking and this unique circumstance finally resulted in a number of key reforms which brought the BiH Armed Forces under unambiguous state level command and control.² It is obvious that these specific experiences are not applicable to other countries, where such constitutional and legal structures do not exist.

Second, attention has to be drawn to the strong presence of the international community in BiH, which exercises wide ranging competencies in accordance with the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA)³, again reflecting the unique circumstances which differ from the reform

landscape in other countries. When talking about aspects of defence reform in BiH, it is necessary to recognize that the international community, in particularly the NATO led Implementation Force (IFOR)/Stabilisation Force (SFOR), now European Force (EUFOR) and NATO, the Office of the High Representative (OHR), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank (WB) and others still play an important role in defining the pace and direction of the reform process. It is difficult to apply the experiences of the Defence Reform Commission to other countries since the Commission's model included international representation combined with BiH participants.

Following these introductory notes, five selected areas where significant progress has been made and of potential interest to Serbia and Montenegro, will be elaborated in more detail.

Parliamentary oversight

The establishment of increasingly efficient parliamentary oversight over the former entity armies, and now the Armed Forces of BiH represents one of the most important goals of defence reform in this country. It is encouraging that according to many foreign observers and international community representatives this segment of defence reform stands out as one of the most successful aspects of reform.

Previous interpretations of the constitutional system in BiH, concentrated democratic oversight of both former entity armies exclusively at the entity level; by the parliamentary defence and security committees of the Republika Srpska National Assembly and FBiH Parliament. Due to the non-existence of a single state level Defence Ministry, the BiH Parliamentary Assembly (BiH PA) did not establish a permanent parliamentary body for military and security issues, although certain initiatives⁴ clearly indicated the need for the establishment of such a permanent parliamentary committee.

The formation of a permanent parliamentary committee on defence and security matters in the BiH PA occurred after the adoption of the Defence Reform Commission's recommendations in the autumn of 2003. Conclusions in both houses of the BiH PA, resulted in the creation of the "Joint Committee for Defence and Security Policy and Monitoring of the Work of Defence and Security Structures on the BiH Level"⁵. This committee held its inaugural session on 18 December 2003. The establishment of the Joint Committee by the BiH PA was also made possible by the sustained implementation of an even longer-term democratic control project of the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina. The OSCE

Mission initially addressed parliamentary committees responsible for defence and security in the entity parliaments.⁶

Since its inaugural session the Joint Committee has held a total of 23 regular sessions. Unlike most other parliamentary committees in BiH, the responsible minister, in this case the BiH Minister of Defence (and his two deputies) attends Committee sessions on a regular basis and report on relevant activities. Notwithstanding all this progress in the work of the Joint Committee there are still many opportunities for further substantive improvement of its work and for a deeper and more critical approach towards the work of the executive bodies.

Besides its regular sessions, the Joint Committee also conducted a number of field activities within BiH (visits to the State Border Service, the State Agency for Investigation and Protection, Interpol, the BiH Mine Action Centre, and to the BiH and entity ministries of defence. Visits to foreign parliaments and defence ministries such as Slovenia, Croatia, Switzerland and Bulgaria have also taken place. In conducting these bilateral visits the Joint Committee was offered an opportunity to exchange experiences in establishing and implementing parliamentary oversight of the defence and security sector, as well as on defence reform issues. A visit to Serbia and Montenegro, as well as the Republic of Macedonia was recently conducted in July 2005 and is expected to provide a first opportunity to meet with senior parliament and ministerial officials from both countries.

Finally, when discussing parliamentary oversight it is appropriate to stress the key role of administrative and expert staff assisting parliamentary committees in their work. The Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) has financed the employment over the last three years of four parliamentary advisors on military affairs. These advisors also continue to be active participants in organized activities such as the recent DRINA seminar. They have significantly contributed to the efficiency and expertise of parliamentary defence and security committees and represent a show-case for the work of parliamentary committees in BiH.

Restructuring of Armed Forces, demobilization of soldiers and resettlement

Since 1996 the armed forces in BiH have been confronted with a constant restructuring, resulting in massive reductions of personnel and equipment. From roughly 250.000 members of the Army of the Republic of BiH (ARBiH), Croat Defence Council (HVO) and Army of Republika Srpska (VRS) in 1995, there are currently 12.000 professional soldiers left in the Armed Forces of BiH, and even this number is expected to drop below 10.000 in the near

future. Personnel reductions have also been carried out in other security institutions, resulting in a need for assistance in support of employment and reintegration into the civil society in order to avoid the creation of a group of unsatisfied demobilized soldiers who possess specific knowledge and skills. It has to be noted that this may have contributed to a large number of private security companies having been formed mostly by former members of the armed forces, police and intelligence services. This development is currently raising serious concerns due to the lack of unified BiH legislation regulating this sensitive matter.

As previously indicated, a significant number of demobilized soldiers applied for assistance in applying for new jobs. The World Bank and other international donors financed various projects that were facilitated and implemented by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in cooperation with local authorities. In addition the OSCE Mission provided considerable assistance in establishing the necessary cooperation and coordination between relevant actors.⁷ Based on this work a few essential conclusions related to assistance to demobilized soldiers can be listed:

- The registration of personal information and especially on qualifications of individuals prior to the demobilization is essential, so that the appropriate assistance can subsequently be provided.
- The support must create preconditions for self-sustainable employment, which has shown to be difficult due to the overall weak economic situation of BiH.
- Substantial donor support in addition to domestic financial resources is necessary.
- The severance payments are more effective at creating new jobs for demobilized soldiers when they are accompanied by additional entrepreneurial training.

In addition to the considerable support to the resettlement projects, both the OSCE Mission and SFOR produced in cooperation with entity defence ministries, two guidebooks for demobilized soldiers in 2002 and 2003. Both publications provide basic information on numerous assistance projects, including both targeted projects for demobilised soldiers and assistance available to any BiH citizen.

Military budgets, affordability and budget transparency

The present level of defence expenditures indicate that there have been tremendous reductions in military spending since the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords. According to estimates made by the OSCE Mission the total level of defence expenditures in BiH in 2000 was approximately 840 million Convertible Marks (KM). This year (2005) the military budgets for Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation of BiH (FBiH) and Republic Srpska (RS) total

274 million KM, this represents a remarkable decrease and cost savings, reducing the potential negative impact on other social welfare priorities. Clearly, the decrease of the defence budgets is mainly the consequence of downsizing the former entity Armed Forces and now the Armed Forces of BiH and of strengthening financial controls. In this context the importance of audits⁸ conducted on the military expenditures in 2000 should be emphasised, these audits provided for the first time detailed information on how much money was being spent for military purposes, affirming the need for reduced spending that is in balance with the financial realities.

Parallel to the reduction of military expenditures, progress was made in improving the quality of the budget planning process providing more transparency to the respective parliaments and wider public. It might be illustrative to recall that back in 1998 the FBiH defence budget was presented and published as one single budget line worth 343 million KM, without any further explanation. A similar approach was followed in the RS and in keeping with the non-transparent way of presenting budget proposals, both entity parliaments were unable to discuss the legitimacy of the planned expenditures. On the other hand, it has to be acknowledged that most of the elected parliamentarians were at that time not willing or not informed sufficiently to review the budget proposals in accordance with the standards of modern parliamentary democracies.

The legislative framework

The legislative framework for the security and defence sector in BiH is largely derived from the former SFRY and has seen fundamental changes since the independence of BiH. Initially, the defence related legislation in the RS simply perpetuated former Yugoslav legislation, unlike the FBiH which enacted a completely new Law on Defence in 1996 (FBiH Official Gazette 15/1996) as a result of intense co-operation with the US Consultancy Company "Military Professional Resources Incorporated" (MPRI).

The next wave of intense legislative reforms in the field of defence was through the establishment of the Defence Reform Commission (DRC) by the High Representative in May 2003.⁹ The DRC recommendations were published in September 2003 in the commission final report, "The Path to Partnership for Peace"¹⁰, and resulted in the enactment of the first ever BiH Law on Defence (BiH Official Gazette 43/2003) and in significant changes to entity constitutions and laws. Pursuant to the new DRC mandate from 31 December 2004¹¹, new preparations for both drafting an entirely new BiH Law on Service in Armed Forces of BiH and extensive changes to the existing Law on Defence were initiated, these were aimed at

establishing full state level command and control over the Armed Forces of BiH. Due to the complexity of these laws, the experiences of other countries in the region were viewed as relevant and highly significant; for example the regulations of the Slovenia regarding their active reserve forces. This Slovenian model regarding active reserve forces as well as the Slovenian experience in abolishing conscript service could also be of interest to SCG.

Having briefly described the development of the wider legislative framework governing defence matters in BiH, another more specific area of legislation for both BiH and SCG linked to the “ORAO” affair¹² should be presented. In response to the evident lack of an appropriate legislative framework on the BiH state level, the BiH Parliamentary Assembly enacted the BiH Law on the Export and Import of Weapons and Military Equipment (BiH Official Gazette 05/2003), as well as a Law on the Production of Arms and Military Equipment (BiH Official Gazette 09/2004). However, the full implementation of both laws, which should guarantee the proper functioning of the military industry in accordance with international standards, is still in progress. Significant material resources are required as well as further efforts to educate personnel involved in the licensing process. It is obvious that only strict compliance with international standards and cross-border cooperation will allow the military industry to operate successfully. Moreover, this sensitive field provides an excellent opportunity for both BiH and SCG to work together on improving the negative image created by violating the embargo on arms exports to Iraq.

Alternative service for conscientious objectors

Legislation in both entities generally recognizes the right to conscientious objection for individuals liable to military service, although in practice implementation of this human right in BiH does not meet with the standards found in most western countries that still maintain conscription. In the FBiH a crucial step forward was made through the passing of the, “Temporary instruction on Performing Alternative Service in Legal Entities and Units of the Army of the Federation of BiH” signed in October 2003, which defined the application process for conscientious objectors and subsequent alternative service in more detail. Unfortunately, despite the courageous approach of the Federation Commission for Alternative Service and the approval of a large number of applications, delays in implementation persist.

In order to comply with the obligations of BiH towards the Council of Europe to enact specific legislation which meet minimum standards to resolve this unsatisfactory situation, a working group consisting of representatives from the local NGO “Conscientious Objection”¹³ and

other concerned international organisations drafted a proposed BiH Law on Conscientious Objection and Alternative Service¹⁴. The draft Law defines unified procedures compliant with international standards and provides institutional solutions fully independent from military structures. One key aspect of the included administrative procedure allowed for the recognition of the conscientious objector's status and that this was not linked to the existence of conscription, thus ensuring the right to reject any kind of military service based on an individual's expression of conscientious objection. With regard to the legislative procedure, the draft Law has been submitted to the Council of Ministers and other relevant institutions for further action by the end of April, but a formal response is still pending. In any case the draft Law can serve as illustrative material for the institutions in SCG.

Conclusion

The shared experiences from Yugoslav times help provide greater context to a number of ongoing defence reforms undertaken by the subsequent newly independent states. Co-operation and sharing of experiences in defence reform between the countries in the region may facilitate ongoing reforms and increase efficiency as best practices are transferred. The experiences from the countries in the region are far more useful and resonate more than the experiences from the countries that are far more developed; these reforms may also be more easily put into practice and transferable. The current efforts at reform of the defence establishments in the region may also prove to be of interest to other transition countries engaged in defence reforms.

¹ The constitution of BiH, Annex 4 of the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA), established only the Standing Committee on Military Matters as a co-ordination body under the BiH Presidency serving in its capacity as the supreme civilian commander. Further defence competencies were not explicitly assigned to the State, although defence can be seen as a State competency flowing from the clearly defined competency for foreign policy.

² For further details see the final Report of the Defence Reform Commission <http://www.ohr.int/archive/drc-report/pdf/drc-eng.pdf> on the OHR internet page www.ohr.int

³ The text of the DPA can be accessed through http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content_id=380 on the OHR internet page www.ohr.int

⁴ In 2002 the BiH PA was forced to establish an ad-hoc Investigation Committee to conduct a parliamentary investigation on illegal storage sites for more than 9000 mortar shells stored in Mostar.

⁵ The decision on the formation of the Joint Committee for Defence and Security Policy was published in the BiH Official Gazette 38/2003.

⁶ Since 1999 the OSCE Mission of BiH has facilitated numerous activities as for example bilateral visits, joint meetings of defence and security committees, bilateral visits, and seminars promoting democratic oversight over institutions in the field of defence and security.

⁷ The Bonn International Center for Concersion (BICC), supported by the Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) published a comprehensive report on 'Demobilization and Reintegration in Post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina', BICC Brief 27, full version accessible under:

<http://www.bicc.de/publications/briefs/brief27/content.php>

⁸ Audits of the defence budgets for 2000 have been conducted based on a recommendation of the Joint Consultative Commission (JCC) in accordance with the provisions of Measure XV of the Agreement on Confidence and Security Building Measures in BiH.

⁹ The full text of the HR Decision:

http://www.ohr.int/decisions/statemattersdec/default.asp?content_id=29840

¹⁰ The full text of the final Report of the Defence Reform Commission: <http://www.ohr.int/archive/drc-report/pdf/drc-eng.pdf>

¹¹ The full text of the Decision on the extension of the mandate of the Defence Reform Commission:

http://www.ohr.int/decisions/statemattersdec/default.asp?content_id=33873

¹² In the year 2002 the illegal sale of weapons to Iraq by the RS company VZ Orao was discovered and the evident need for systemic reform measures subsequently led to the establishing of the DRC.

¹³ The internet-page of the BiH campaign on alternative service: <http://www.prigovorbih.org/>

¹⁴ The draft BiH Law on Conscientious Objection and Alternative Service can be accessed on the internet-page of the NGO "Prigovor savjesti" with the following link:

<http://www.prigovorbih.org/docs/PRIJEDLOG%20ZAKONA%20o%20prigovoru%20savjesti%20i%20civilnoj%20sluzbi.doc>

Annex I

DEMOCRATIC REFORM AND CONTROL OF THE DEFENCE ORGANISATION

13-14 May 2005, Belgrade, Serbia and Montenegro
Media Center – Makedonska 5

A workshop organised by:

- The Belgrade Centre for European Integration (BeCEI), Serbia and Montenegro
- The Centre for European Security Studies (CESS), the Netherlands

In co-operation with:

- The Centre for Security Studies (CSS), Bosnia and Herzegovina

The purpose of the DRINA project is to promote a bilateral dialogue between the security communities – including the civil societies – of BiH and SCG, concerning defence reform and admittance of both countries to the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme. Both countries face similar – though not identical – challenges in reforming their defence structures and in preparing for PfP membership. Next to bringing representatives of the neighbouring countries together to discuss ‘common’ defence reform challenges it is the purpose of DRINA to involve young and talented professionals from the executive, the legislature and civil-society.

FRIDAY 13 MAY 2005

09.30 – 10.00 Registration

10.00 – 10.15

Words of welcome and purpose of the exercise

- **Jos Boonstra**, Programme Manager, Centre for European Security Studies, the Netherlands
- **Jovan Teokarevic**, Director, Belgrade Centre for European Integration, Serbia and Montenegro
- **Denis Hadzovic**, Secretary-General, Centre for Security Studies, Bosnia and Herzegovina

10.15 – 11.15

Session I Defence reform in Serbia-Montenegro and PfP membership

Chair:

- **Jovan Teokarevic**, Director, Belgrade Centre for European Integration, Serbia and Montenegro

Keynote Speeches:

- **Pavle Jankovic**, Assistant Minister for Defence Policy, Ministry of Defence, Serbia and Montenegro
- **John Colston**, Assistant Secretary General, Defence Policy and Planning Division, NATO HQ, Belgium

The Istanbul Summit of June 2004 did not bring PfP membership to SCG and BiH. However, it marked a further step in co-operation with NATO. Defence reform alone is not enough to accede to PfP and is complicated by political demands. In this sense SCG (or BiH for that matter) can join either sooner or later. In this opening session

the extent of progress made towards PfP will be identified and it will focus on related political and reform issues.

11.15 – 11.45	Coffee Break
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11.45 – 13.15	<p>Session II Defence reform in Serbia-Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina: possibilities for sharing experiences and co-operation?</p> <p>Chair:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Denis Hadzovic, Secretary-General, Centre for Security Studies, Bosnia and Herzegovina <p>Speakers:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• George Katsirdakis, Head of Defence Cooperation, Defence Policy and Planning Division, NATO HQ, Belgium• Ahmet Omerovic, Head, Division for Operations, Sector for Policy and Planning, Ministry of Defence, Bosnia and Herzegovina• Miroslav Mladenovic, Deputy Head, Public Relations Department, Ministry of Defence, Serbia and Montenegro <p><i>This session aims at identifying similar issues and challenges that SCG as well as BiH face in relation to PfP membership and defence reform. The purpose here is to find common ground between SCG and BiH for constructive dialogue, information sharing and the use of best practices.</i></p>
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13.15 – 14.45	Lunch
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14.45 – 16.15	<p>Session III The road to PfP membership: development of enhanced co-operation with NATO</p> <p>Chair:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• George Katsirdakis, Head of Defence Cooperation, Defence Policy and Planning Division, NATO HQ, Belgium <p>Speakers:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Amadeo Watkins, Senior Research Fellow, South-East Europe & Mediterranean, Advanced Research & Assessment Group, Defence Academy, United Kingdom• Branislav Milinkovic (Serbia-Montenegro), Special Envoy to NATO, Belgium• Brane Jankovic, Head of PfP/NATO Branch, Sector for International Co-operation, Ministry of Defence, Bosnia and Herzegovina <p><i>The Tailored Co-operation Programme (TCP) was presented at the Istanbul Summit as the final steppingstone to PfP accession. How has co-operation between NATO and SCG since then developed? How have recent political developments influenced the development of enhanced co-operation, particularly in relation to the ICTY? This session outlines/traces the development of co-operation between SCG and NATO in the light of TCP and looks at further future involvement with NATO through assistance and co-operation.</i></p>
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16.15 – 16.30	Coffee Break
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16.30 – 18.15 **Session IV Panel discussion on parliamentary oversight: transparency and accountability in security sector reform**

Moderator:

- **Branislav Milinkovic** (Serbia and Montenegro), Special Envoy to NATO, Belgium

Speakers:

- **Borislav Banovic**, Chairman Committee on Defence, Assembly of Serbia and Montenegro
- **Jan Dirk Blaauw**, former Member of Parliament and former President of the WEU Assembly, the Netherlands
- **Zvonko Obradovic**, Member, Commission for Oversight of Intelligence, Assembly of Serbia and Montenegro
- **Mladen Momcilovic**, Deputy Program Director, Security Sector Reform for Serbia-Montenegro, National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, Serbia and Montenegro

An important prerequisite for accession to Euro-Atlantic security structures is democratic control of the armed forces. Transparency and accountability are essential notions in establishing effective parliamentary oversight. How do the SCG 'watch-dog' committees exercise oversight of security and defence? What should possibly be improved and in what assistance might be necessary?

19.00 Dinner

SATURDAY 14 MAY 2005

10.00 – 11.30 **Session V Defence reform in unpromising circumstances: State Union arrangements versus separate structures and the consequences of both options on relations with NATO**

Chair:

- **Vladimir Bilandzic**, Special Advisor on CSBM, OSCE Mission to Serbia and Montenegro

Speakers:

- **Zoran Kusovac**, Analyst Balkans & South-East Europe, Jane's Geopolitical, Italy
- **Jovan Teokarevic**, Director, Belgrade Centre for European Integration, Serbia and Montenegro
- **James Lyon** (United States), Director Serbia Project, International Crisis Group, Serbia and Montenegro

Uncertainty regarding the future state structure of SCG leads to friction between separate state structures on the one hand and the state union as a whole on the other. What are the implications for current defence reforms? What steps in reform can be taken regardless of the future state structure for Serbia and Montenegro? And what would be realistic future alternatives for SCG in relation to defence reform?

11.30 – 12.00 Coffee Break

12.00 – 13.15

Session VI The role of civil society in exercising control, providing education and promoting debate on security sector reform in Serbia-Montenegro

Chair:

- **Zoran Kusovac**, Analyst Balkans & South-East Europe, Jane's Geopolitical, Italy

Speakers:

- **Miroslav Hadzic**, President of the Managing Board, Centre for Civil-Military Relations, Serbia and Montenegro
- **Liviu Muresan**, Executive President, EURISC Foundation, Romania
- **Svetlana Djurdjevic-Lukic**, Researcher, Institute of International Politics and Economics, Serbia and Montenegro

A vibrant and well-functioning civil society is an essential factor for developing and maintaining democratic oversight of the security sector. How is the civil society in SCG currently involved in security sector reform? What lessons and 'neighbourhood experiences' can be drawn from other countries in the region?

13.15 – 13.30

Concluding Remarks

- **Jos Boonstra**, Programme Manager, Centre for European Security Studies, the Netherlands
- **Jovan Teokarevic**, Director, Belgrade Centre for European Integration, Serbia and Montenegro

Annex II

DEFENCE REFORM IN THE POST-DAYTON CONTEXT

10-11 June 2005, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina
Holiday Inn – Zmaja Od Bosne 4

A workshop organised by:

- The Centre for Security Studies (CSS), Bosnia and Herzegovina
- The Centre for European Security Studies (CESS), the Netherlands

In co-operation with:

- The Belgrade Centre for European Integration (BeCEI), Serbia and Montenegro

The purpose of the DRINA project is to promote a bilateral dialogue between the security communities – including the civil societies – of BiH and SCG, concerning defence reform and admittance of both countries to the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme. Both countries face similar – though not identical – challenges in reforming their defence structures and in preparing for PfP membership. Next to bringing representatives of the neighbouring countries together to discuss ‘common’ defence reform challenges it is the purpose of DRINA to involve young and talented professionals from the executive, the legislature and civil-society.

FRIDAY 10 JUNE 2005

09.30 – 10.00 Registration

10.00 – 10.15 **Words of welcome and purpose of the exercise**

- **Jos Boonstra**, Programme Manager, Centre for European Security Studies, the Netherlands
- **Denis Hadzovic**, Secretary General, Centre for Security Studies, Bosnia and Herzegovina

10.15 – 11.30 **Session I Defence reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina and PfP membership**

Chair:

- **Denis Hadzovic**, Secretary General, CSS, Bosnia and Herzegovina

Keynote Speeches:

- **Marina Pendes**, Deputy Minister of Defence, Bosnia and Herzegovina
- **Douglas Davidson**, Head of the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina

The Istanbul Summit of June 2004 did not bring PfP membership to BiH and SCG. However, it marked a further step in co-operation with NATO. Defence reform alone is not enough to accede to PfP and is complicated by political demands. In this sense BiH (or SCG for that matter) can join either sooner or later. In this opening session the extent of progress made towards PfP will be identified and it will focus on related political and reform issues.

11.30 – 12.00 Coffee Break

12.00 – 13.15	<p>Session II Defence reform in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia-Montenegro: possibilities for sharing experiences and co-operation?</p> <p>Chair:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Slavisa Sucur, Member of the Defence Committee, Parliament of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina <p>Speakers:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ahmet Omerovic, Chief, Department for Operations, Ministry of Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina • Mladen Momcilovic, Deputy Program Director, Security Sector Reform for Serbia-Montenegro, National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, Serbia and Montenegro • Christian Haupt, Political Advisor, Head Parliamentary Section, Department of Security Co-operation, OSCE, Bosnia and Herzegovina <p><i>This session aims at identifying similar issues and challenges that BiH as well as SCG are facing in relation to PfP membership and defence reform. The purpose here is to find common ground between SCG and BiH for constructive dialogue, information sharing and the use of best practices.</i></p>
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13.15 – 14 30	Lunch
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14.30 – 16.00	<p>Session III Parliamentary oversight: transparency and accountability in security sector reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina</p> <p>Moderator:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Zeljko Grubestic, Defence and Security Expert, Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina <p>Speakers:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Jan Dirk Blaauw, former Member of Parliament and former President of the WEU Assembly, the Netherlands • Miroslav Filipovic, former Member of Parliament, Civil Alliance, Serbia and Montenegro <p><i>An important prerequisite for accession to Euro-Atlantic security structures is democratic control of the armed forces. Transparency and accountability are essential notions in establishing effective parliamentary oversight. How do the BiH 'watch-dog' committees exercise oversight of security and defence? What should possibly be improved and what assistance might be necessary?</i></p>
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16.00 – 16.30	Coffee Break
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16.30 – 18.00	<p>Session IV Needs and options for strengthening regional and bilateral parliamentary co-operation</p> <p>Chair:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Enes Zukanovic, Defence and Security Expert, Parliament of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina <p>Speakers:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ioan Pașcu, former Minister of National Defence, Member of the House of Deputies, Romania • Zvonko Obradovic, Member, Commission for Oversight of Intelligence, Assembly of Serbia and Montenegro
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Both the European Union and NATO strongly encourage regional and bilateral co-operation in the context of security structures. In the field of parliamentary co-operation much is to gain from regional experience-sharing for both BiH and SCG. In this respect, what can BiH and SCG learn from each other and from a country like Romania?

SATURDAY 11 JUNE 2005

10.00 – 11.15 **Session V The road to PfP membership: development of enhanced co-operation with NATO**

Chair:

- **Brane Jankovic**, Head of the division NATO/PfP, Ministry of Defence, Bosnia and Herzegovina

Speakers:

- **Sven Alkalaj**, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina to NATO, Belgium
- **Patrice Dabos**, Public Diplomacy Division, NATO HQ, Belgium

The Tailored Co-operation Programme (TCP) was presented at the Istanbul Summit as the final steppingstone to PfP accession. How has co-operation between NATO and BiH since then developed? How have recent political developments influenced the development of enhanced co-operation, particularly in relation to the ICTY? This session outlines/traces the development of co-operation between BiH and NATO in the light of TCP and looks at further future involvement with NATO through assistance and co-operation.

11.15 – 11.45 Coffee Break

11.45 – 13.00 **Session VI Strengthening efficient civilian command and control structures of the state-level Ministry of Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina**

Chair:

- **Momo Sevarika**, Security Expert, National Assembly of the Republika Srpska, Bosnia and Herzegovina

Speakers:

- **Brane Jankovic**, Head division for NATO/PfP Bosnia and Herzegovina
- **Dusko Vejnovic**, Professor in Security Affairs, University of Banja Luka, Bosnia and Herzegovina
- **Raffi Gregorian**, Deputy Chairman, Defence Reform Commission, NATO HQ in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina

One of the three conditions for acquiring PfP membership is establishing efficient military command and control at the state level. BiH has not yet fulfilled this prerequisite but has made some remarkable progress in recent years. What is currently the relation between the state level in BiH and the entities? What difficulties have been encountered and how can the state level be further strengthened?

13.00 – 13.15 **Concluding Remarks**

- **Jos Boonstra**, Programme Manager, CESS, the Netherlands
- **Denis Hadzovic**, Secretary General, CSS, Bosnia and Herzegovina